Security of energy supply and gas diversification in Poland by Weiner, Csaba
  
 Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences – Institute of World Economics 
 MTA Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont 
Világgazdasági Intézet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working paper 
 
243. 
 
 
 
August 2018 
 
 
 
 
Csaba Weiner 
 
 
 
SECURITY OF ENERGY SUPPLY AND  
GAS DIVERSIFICATION IN POLAND 
 
 Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS Institute of World Economics  
Working Paper Nr. 243 (2018) 1–75. August 2018 
 
 
 
Security of energy supply and gas diversification in 
Poland 
 
 
 
 
 
Author: 
 
Csaba Weiner 
 
senior research fellow 
Institute of World Economics 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
Email: weiner.csaba [at] krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
The contents of this paper are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of other 
members of the research staff of the Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS 
 
 
 
ISSN 1215-5241 
ISBN 978-963-301-671-8
  Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS 
Institute of World Economics  
Working Paper 243 (2018) 1–75. August 2018 
 
 
Security of energy supply and gas diversification in Poland* 
 
Csaba Weinera 
 
 
Abstract 
Poland entered the twenty-first century with an unsustainable energy/electricity mix, strongly over-
dependent on coal. This situation seems to be changing very slowly, while there are multiple factors that 
make it imperative for the issue to be urgently addressed. On the one hand, this paper aims to assess the 
security of the stationary fuel supply by applying the conventional three-dimensional approach, 
encompassing availability, affordability and sustainability. On the other, we plan to use our own scheme 
to analyse gas diversification (Weiner, 2017: 6), i.e. a fuel which, alongside coal, is a very sensitive issue 
linked to the security of the Polish electric power fuel supply. We demonstrate that the three-dimensional 
approach is also appropriate for addressing the issue of supply security in the case of a country with a 
securitized energy agenda based on fears of problems with the availability and affordability of Russian 
gas supplies. It also highlights Poland’s concern over foreign technological reliance regarding renewables 
production. We show how the energy perspective, the institutional context, as well as perceptions 
regarding threat, dependence and Russia influence choices made from among different security of supply 
dimensions. We find that though the role of coal will surely decrease, there is great uncertainty about 
Poland’s energy policy and security of supply because of deficiencies in infrastructure and the unknown 
future role of the particular fuels in the energy/electricity mix, also expected to include nuclear. We can 
observe that every energy policy step possible is being taken to maintain the role of coal, and Poland 
moves toward sustainability only as much and as soon as it is required by its EU membership. Not only 
does the coal industry capture Poland’s energy policy, but also geopolitical considerations cement 
reliance on coal, providing low energy import dependence. Regarding gas, we find that since the January 
2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland has taken action to diversify its gas supplies, and it has finally 
achieved results, but there is still a lot of uncertainty surrounding Russian gas imports. 
JEL: L71, L95, O13, P28, Q4 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper is the second in a series assessing gas1 diversification and the security of 
the supply of stationary fuels in selected Central and East European (CEE) EU member 
states (Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Bulgaria). With in-depth case studies, this series 
underlines these countries’ different conditions, various priorities, and thus differing 
energy policies, despite their common concerns, primarily linked to being dependent on 
Russia for energy supplies (Weiner, 2016). These differences have broad policy-oriented 
implications. For instance, due to the cross-border implications of energy policy 
decisions, one cannot ignore the energy policies of other countries. Conflicting energy 
policies can lead to conflicts and become barriers to regional cooperation, while such is 
essential to enhance supply security and has been strongly encouraged by the EU. Since 
the 2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, not only the EU member states but also the EU 
itself have been focusing strongly on supply security and establishing such cooperation 
networks. With events in Ukraine in 2014, Russia came to represent a real threat for 
many Europeans, and thus the EU found an external enemy against whom to unite 
(Overland, 2017: 126). The EU’s February 2015 Energy Union Framework Strategy 
called for moving away from fossil fuels and a centralized, supply-side approach relying 
on old technologies and outdated business models, as well as away from a fragmented 
system of uncoordinated national policies and energy-isolated areas (Vinois, 2017: 43). 
The Energy Union Framework Strategy stated that it would consider reframing the 
energy relations with Russia (Yafimava, 2015: 15). Since then, the European 
Commission has published several packages of measures to ensure the Energy Union is 
achieved, and has also published regular reports on the progress of the Energy Union 
(European Commission, n.d.-b). However, without a complex assessment of the particular 
CEE countries, one will not understand the reasons behind energy policy decisions and 
security of supply and diversification achievements or be able to influence these 
processes. 
The first country assessment referred to Hungary (Weiner, 2017). In the first part of 
our research, we defined several energy policy-related concepts, and then focused on 
security of supply and diversification in order to find the appropriate methodology for 
                                                 
1 If otherwise not indicated, gas refers to natural gas. 
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assessing the selected CEE countries. As a result, on the one hand, we took a 
conventional approach to assessing the security of stationary fuel supply, and, on the 
other, we used our own scheme in order to understand gas diversification. The 
presented methodology allows cross-country comparisons, and makes it possible to 
arrive at some generalizations. Thus, using the same methodology, this paper looks at 
our second country, Poland. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology. It deals with 
two notions, security of supply and diversification. Regarding security of supply, it 
questions whether the chosen methodology can be applied without modifications to a 
country which has a securitized energy agenda. Here, geopolitical considerations and 
the notion of the “energy/gas weapon” are addressed in detail. Section 3 presents and 
discusses the empirical results through the lens of two case studies. After providing a 
snapshot of Polish electricity market trends, Section 3.1 assesses the security of supply 
of coal, renewables and nuclear power in Poland. Section 3.2 starts with a look at the role 
of gas and Russian gas in Europe (Section 3.2.1), while Section 3.2.2 centres on Poland’s 
gas diversification options and achievements. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 
4. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
In order to assess energy policy decisions and achievements, comprehensive 
definitions of several energy policy-related concepts should be provided. For a net 
energy importer, the most important among these are security of supply and 
diversification. Security of supply is one aspect of energy security, while the other is 
security of demand, which net energy exporters aim to increase. 
Security of supply has no uniform definition. There are different ways of approaching 
the term (Table 1). One can limit one’s understanding of the issue purely to traditional 
survival-based definitions, but special care should be shown when attempting to move 
the term security from a military context and apply it to non-military issues, particularly 
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to energy (Buzan et al., 1998).2 Another approach is applicable if security of supply is 
considered as a concept that has different dimensions. The simplest and oldest 
definitions are two-dimensional, referring to availability and price. These two 
dimensions can also be called the physical and the economic dimensions (Cherp et al., 
2012: 330) or physical and price security (Wicks, 2009: 8). However, over time, many 
multidimensional definitions have emerged, reflecting the different interests and 
energy-related challenges in various time periods, but many dimensions can overlap in 
one way or another. Aside from the aforementioned, other possible definitions have also 
been proposed. For example, according to Cherp and Jewell (2011), security of supply 
has three perspectives – sovereignty, robustness and resilience. 
 
Table 1. A compilation of different definitions of security of supply 
1. Traditionalists’ survival-based definitions 
– Buzan et al. (1998) 
2. Dimensional classifications 
– two-dimensional definitions: availability and price (cost) 
   – Manners (1964), IEA (1985), UNDP (2000), Yergin (2006, 2011) 
– three- and multidimensional definitions 
   – Elkind (2010): availability, reliability, affordability and environmental sustainability 
   – APERC (2007): four ‘A’s: availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability 
   – Sovacool and Mukherjee (2011): availability, affordability, technology development, sustainability  
   and regulation 
   – Alhajji (2007): economic, environmental, social, foreign policy, technical and security dimensions 
   – Wicks (2009): physical, price and geopolitical security 
   – Hippel et al. (2011): environment, technology, demand-side management, social-cultural factors and  
   international relations or military risks 
3. Other definitions 
– Cherp and Jewell (2011): three perspectives: sovereignty, robustness and resilience 
– Stirling (2007): system properties consisting of stability, durability, resilience and robustness 
Source: Weiner (2017: 4). 
 
In our paper (Weiner, 2017), we argued that the conventional three-dimensional 
approach, encompassing availability, affordability and sustainability, was appropriate to 
consider security of supply. Here, the main focus is on primary energy fuels – coal, 
natural gas, renewables and nuclear fuel3 – in relation to electricity as a secondary 
energy source,4 but the three-dimensional approach is also applied, in part, to electricity 
                                                 
2 Cited by Yafimava (2012: 12). 
3 Oil is not discussed here as it is principally a transportation fuel. 
4 Heat is only partially covered here. However, regarding gas diversification, the whole domestic gas 
consumption is taken into consideration. 
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(i.e. in relation to specific primary energy).5 As mentioned, the great advantage of this 
simple method is that it allows cross-country comparison. However, Poland’s approach 
to energy policy is securitized. For one who looks at energy as a private good with 
strong public goods characteristics, energy is a matter of low politics. Nevertheless, for 
many states, such as Poland, energy policy is also a matter of high politics. Hence, some 
of its public goods characteristics are of a strategic nature (a strategic good) (Anderson 
et al., 2017b: 4). Poland’s attitude is no novelty. What is new is how the EU’s approach 
has changed. Due to the return of geopolitics in the 2000s and the 2010s, the EU has 
begun to implement policy answers aimed at making its regulatory state approach fit the 
current situation, in which other players are more mercantilist and consider energy both 
as a strategic good and a potential foreign policy tool. The European Commission 
responded to the Russian geopolitical challenge by treating Russia’s state-controlled gas 
giant Gazprom as a dominant market player and deploying its full regulatory toolbox, as 
well as by applying a more direct and interventionist use of the EU’s economic power 
(Anderson et al., 2017a: 14). 
Geopolitical considerations are also related to the notion of the “energy/gas 
weapon/diplomacy”,6 which has been widely debated in literature. There are two main 
questions linked to the energy weapon. One aspect to consider is the precise meaning of 
the term, and the other is whether Russia really uses such methods. According to Smith 
Stegen (2011: 6506–6506), “energy weapon” refers to a situation in which resources are 
converted into real political power through the manipulation of supply and prices and 
then used to yield foreign policy gains (to influence policies, coerce political concessions 
or punish customers). Smith Stegen (2011: 6506) claims that four stages or conditions 
are necessary for the successful implementation of an energy weapon: (1) the state must 
consolidate the country’s energy resources; (2) the state must acquire control over 
transit routes; (3) the state must use the energy resources in an attempt to further its 
own political objectives; and (4) the dependent government must acquiesce to the 
                                                 
5 Thus, exports, imports, electricity transmission infrastructure, and so on, are not in the forefront of the 
issues we consider. 
6 This is related to one of Cherp and Jewell’s (2011) three perspectives, i.e. sovereignty, even though this is 
a different approach. Cherp and Jewell suggest the following three perspectives on security of supply: the 
robustness of energy systems (sufficiency of resources, reliability of infrastructure and stable and 
affordable prices), their sovereignty (protection from potential threats from external agents, such as 
unfriendly political powers and overly powerful market agents) and their resilience (the ability to 
withstand diverse disruptions) (see Table 1). 
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threats, price hikes or cut-offs. Smith Stegen (2011: 6506) finds that Russia was more 
often unsuccessful than successful in implementing its energy weapon. Yafimava (2015: 
3) defines the “gas weapon” as a reduction or cut-off of supplies in order to force 
compliance with political and strategic aims, and finds no evidence of Russia having 
used it in European countries, but acknowledges its application in Ukraine in the 1990s. 
Grigas (2012: 33) clarifies this by stating that except for the 1993 incident with Estonia, 
an unsuccessful one-day gas cut aimed at changing Estonia’s citizenship policies, Russia 
has never engaged in a direct gas war in non-CIS Europe.7 Smith Stegen (2011: 6509) 
also mentions the Baltic States as examples in non-CIS Europe – Estonia is again cited. 
Nonetheless, the supporters of the political argument can point to Putin’s February 2003 
speech at the tenth anniversary of the founding of Gazprom, during which he stated that 
Gazprom was a powerful political and economic lever of influence over the rest of the 
world (Kupchinsky, 2004). 
Researchers with the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies have consistently and 
convincingly argued that Gazprom’s commercial interests prevail over political 
considerations. Pirani (2012: 14) states that Russia’s activities on export markets were 
directed mainly at strengthening Gazprom’s commercial position, and this was very 
rarely trumped by political considerations. Stern (2015: 11) uses the concept of political 
pricing for Gazprom’s decisions, supported or ordered by the Russian government, to tie 
gas prices to decisions on gas infrastructure or investments, or to other non-gas bilateral 
issues between Russia and the given country. Stern (2015: 11) argues that the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) confirmed the first 
allegation in relation to Bulgaria and Poland (see in Section 3.2.2 below). As to the 
second allegation, we find that the practice of package deals can also be maintained by 
the consumer nation. For example, the Hungarian government (2010–) has tended to 
combine very different issues (the long-term gas supply contract, the Paks II project, the 
Budapest subway, and so on) into a single deal (Menedzsment Fórum, 2010; 24.hu, 2010; 
Grib and Lukyanov, 2010). Even so, Stern (2015: 11) questions allegations over 
Gazprom’s political gas pricing in non-CIS Europe, claiming that Russia aims at 
extracting maximum revenues (referring to the practice of discriminating monopoly 
                                                 
7 The 12 non-Baltic former Soviet Republics still tend to be referred to as the CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) countries, though, currently, it is a regional organisation consisting of only ten post-
Soviet republics (Georgia and Ukraine are not members of the CIS). 
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pricing) rather than political concessions. However, Stern (2015: 11) mentions a recent 
exception, which occurred between the summer of 2014 and March 2015, when 
Gazprom intentionally failed to meet daily gas volumes as requested by many European 
buyers. This was supposedly at the request of the Russian president with the 
commercial intentions of curtailing reverse flow gas to Ukraine from Europe and thus 
forcing Ukraine to buy more Russian gas. It might also have been a means of providing 
support for falling European hub prices. Yafimava (2015: 3) also advocates the 
commercial argument, since “much of Gazprom’s behaviour towards all European 
countries could be explained by its desire to extract maximum revenues rather than 
political concessions”. 
The problem is that once a sector is securitized, this legitimizes extraordinary steps 
to solve a policy problem and prevents that sector from becoming subject to regular 
political or academic debates (Boersma and Goldthau, 2017: 111). The Polish energy 
landscape is determined by two main factors. The first is Poland’s need to reduce 
external dependence, while the second is to preserve the role of coal. The latter is also 
partly related to the first factor, in addition to other domestic economic, social and 
political aspects. Besides coal, the most sensitive issue regarding the Polish supply 
security is that of gas.8 In contrast to coal, Poland is heavily dependent on gas imports. 
Poland’s focus on self-sufficiency and independence from foreign influence is not a 
reaction limited to Russia alone, but also includes Germany (Heinrich et al., 2017: 6). 
Dependence on Russia is linked mainly to gas and oil imports,9 while in the case of 
Germany this dependence is seen as related to the country’s renewable technologies. 
Heinrich et al. (2016: 2) argue that renewables are viewed by many as not only 
potentially risky for security of supply because they are considered expensive, 
unreliable and volatile, but they can also perpetuate Poland’s energy dependence on 
foreign countries. There is concern that Germany is interested in spreading its transition 
by promoting its own industries and in further enhancing its technological dominance. 
Naturally, Poland considers Russia and its gas as the main threat to Poland’s security of 
supply. Nonetheless, the trans-Baltic Sea Nord Stream gas pipeline brought together 
Germany and Russia within the framework of a project that poses a threat to Poland. It 
                                                 
8 The importance of the gas sector is also underlined by the Polish Policy for the Natural Gas Industry, 
adopted in March 2007, though this is a short and quite unsophisticated document (Ministry of Economy, 
2007). 
9 Russian coal imports are not regarded as a threat (see below in section dealing with coal). 
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should be emphasized that Poland has palpable historical grievances towards both 
countries. For this reason, Poland is particularly sensitive to any such arrangements 
between its two neighbours. Historical relations with Russia have a decisive role in 
Polish energy policies. In the EU, Poland is considered to be part of the group of Russian 
sceptics, wishing to see the EU use mercantilist tools within the Energy Union to 
strengthen its position vis-á-vis Russia (Nosko and Mišík, 2017). 
Politicians and industry players in Europe approach gas security differently. Stern 
highlights that “when politicians and media commentators speak about gas security 
problems, they only talk about Russia and nothing else”, while gas industry people speak 
about “the decline of production in the Netherlands, the UK and, further in the future, 
Norway” (Simon, 2018). Poland is sticking to the “dependence on Russian imports 
equals gas insecurity” formula, which would be in line with the 1970s definition of 
supply security. The Baltic states approach gas security similarly, while other CEE 
countries are less politically motivated (Jonathan Stern, email communication, 7, 9 
February 2018). 
Energy independence can basically be interpreted in two ways. According to the hard 
definition, energy or gas independence refers to independence from energy or gas 
imports (i.e. self-sufficiency) (Weiner, 2016), while the soft definition suggests that the 
aim is to have import source diversity, in order to reduce reliance on unstable and 
unfriendly nations (Branko, 2012; Stelzer, 2009). Seemingly, Poland understands 
independence in a very strict sense, but, as Bazilian et al. (2013) conclude, this aim can 
promote suboptimal policy choices. However, full independence is extremely difficult to 
achieve. 
Since the aim to reduce external dependence as much as possible is related to the fact 
that the energy policy agenda is securitized in Poland, a politically-motivated approach 
should also be included in the dimensional assessment of security of supply. Existing 
literature provides three options of coping with this problem: (1) these political 
considerations should represent another distinct (fourth) dimension of security of 
supply – in addition to availability, affordability and sustainability; or (2) these aspects 
could be included under the dimension of availability; or (3) an attempt should be made 
not to mix security of supply with geopolitical arguments, thus to treat geopolitical 
threats as outside the scope of security of supply. As presented in Table 1, there are 
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several examples of the treatment of a politically-motivated approach as a distinct 
dimension of security of supply, such as Alhajii’s (2007) six dimensions (economic, 
environmental, social, foreign policy, technical and security), Wicks’ (2009: 8) three-
dimensional approach (physical, price and geopolitical security), Hippel et al.’s (2011) 
comprehensive concept of supply security (environment, technology, demand-side 
management, social-cultural factors and international relations or military risks) and, for 
instance, the US President’s All-of-the-Above Energy Strategy (energy supply 
availability, reliability, affordability and geopolitical considerations) (EOP, 2014: 20). 
Conversely, APERC’s (2007) four ‘A’s of security of supply include geopolitical aspects 
under the dimension of accessibility. However, Hughes (2012: 229) claims that the 
omission of accessibility could be justified, since accessibility can be considered as part 
of availability: if access to an energy flow is problematic, this is reflected in its 
availability. In contrast, regarding gas, Dickel et al. (2014) distinguish gas security from 
among the various geopolitical threats to national security when discussing European 
dependence on Russian gas, and suggest that countries with strong geopolitical fears 
need to either terminate or not renew their long-term contracts with Gazprom. 
However, they warn this would require taking many additional measures, including 
investments in liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals, pipeline connections, 
alternative energy sources, energy conservation and efficiency. Yafimava (2015) also 
differentiates between commercial and geopolitical points of view when analysing 
European dependence on Russian gas. 
In opposition to the above-discussed three options of coping with the analysed issues, 
we claim that the politically-motivated approach is not a separate dimension, or part of a 
dimension, or outside of the three dimensions, but rather an influencing factor. We 
argue that decisions on security of supply and diversification are the consequences of 
choices made from among different security of supply dimensions. These choices should 
be made on the basis of such influencing factors as the following: (1) the energy 
perspective (the energy market supply/demand and price conditions); (2) the 
institutional context (the role of the EU); (3) the government’s approach towards 
dependence and its perceptions and expectations of threat, as well as its relations with 
Russia. Naturally, all these factors are dynamic and change over time. The politically-
motivated approach equals our third category. As Palonkorpi (n.d.) claims, perceptions 
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are important when evaluating dependence. In the case of Poland, these perceptions 
have a major influence on choices made from among different security of supply 
dimensions. 
Finally, besides security of supply, another important concept is diversification, which 
is a means of enhancing security of supply. We have developed a scheme of different CEE 
diversification options for Russian gas imports (Figure 1). Basically, diversification can 
be domestic or external. Possible domestic diversification options include reduced gas 
consumption, increased internal gas production and sectoral diversification on the basis 
of fuels or energy produced domestically. External diversification comprises gas import 
source diversification, transit or route diversification, and sectoral diversification based 
on imported fuels or energy. The aforementioned diversification options can be further 
broken down. 
 
Figure 1. Central and East European gas diversification scheme 
 
Source: Weiner (2017: 6), partly based on Balmaceda (2008, 2013) and Stern (2002). 
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When evaluating stationary fuel supply and gas diversification, we review energy 
policies and related national and EU documents, as well as statements made by 
governments and other stakeholders on security of supply (threats). We also analyse 
stated aspirations and progress made towards enhancing stationary fuel supply and gas 
diversification over the past ten years, and investigate the reasons behind the results. 
 
 
3. Case studies 
 
3.1. Case study 1: security of supply in Poland 
Since 1990, final electricity consumption and total gross electricity production in 
Poland has followed an upward trend with some slumps, while net heat production has 
shown a declining trajectory also with some fluctuation (Eurostat, 2018c, 2018d). In 
2016, electricity production reached 166.6 TWh, while domestic consumption totalled 
168.6 TWh. Poland used to be a net electricity exporter, but, for the first time in 2014, 
and then in 2016 (but not in 2015), it imported more electricity than it exported.10 Net 
imports were 2 TWh (Table 2) (Eurostat, 2018c).11 
 
Table 2. Poland’s electricity balance, 2004–2016 (GWh) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Imports 5 312 5 002 4 789 7 761 9 034 7 403 6 310 
Exports 14 605 16 188 15 775 13 109 9 703 9 594 7 664 
Net imports -9 293 -11 186 -10 986 -5 348 -669 -2 191 -1 354 
Total gross production 154 159 156 936 161 742 159 348 155 305 151 720 157 657 
Total net production* 140 789 143 615 147 685 145 393 141 498 137 908 143 457 
Available for final consumption 104 193 105 005 110 634 114 092 117 189 112 305 118 690 
Final consumption 104 193 105 005 110 634 114 092 117 189 112 305 118 690 
Total consumption** 144 866 145 750 150 756 154 000 154 636 149 529 156 303 
Net imports/total consumption (%)*** -6.4 -7.7 -7.3 -3.5 -0.4 -1.5 -0.9 
(continued on next page) 
 
                                                 
10 In 2016, Poland’s electricity import partners were as follows: Germany – 8 754 GWh, Sweden – 2 764 
GWh, Lithuania – 1 034 GWh, Ukraine – 957 GWh, the Czech Republic – 505 GWh, and Slovakia – 3 GWh. 
On the other hand, exports came from the following countries: the Czech Republic – 7 193 GWh, Slovakia – 
4 187 GWh, Lithuania – 440 GWh, Sweden – 176 GWh, and Germany – 15 GWh (Ministry of Energy, 2017b: 
37). 
11 We use our own calculations based on Eurostat data. The Polish Energy Regulatory Office (URE) claims 
162.6 TWh for electricity production and 164.6 TWh for domestic consumption (URE, 2017: 11). 
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Table (continued) 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Imports 6 780 9 803 7 801 13 508 14 459 14 017 
Exports 12 022 12 643 12 322 11 342 14 793 12 018 
Net imports -5 242 -2 840 -4 521 2 166 -334 1 999 
Total gross production 163 548 162 139 164 580 159 059 164 944 166 635 
Total net production* 148 913 147 649 150 079 145 214 150 695 152 003 
Available for final consumption 121 492 122 169 123 557 125 347 127 819 132 839 
Final consumption 121 492 122 169 123 557 125 347 127 819 132 839 
Total consumption** 158 306 159 299 160 059 161 225 164 610 168 634 
Net imports/total consumption (%)*** -3.3 -1.8 -2.8 1.3 -0.2 1.2 
* Total net production = total gross production – own consumption of power plants. 
** Total consumption = net imports + total gross production. 
*** Negative numbers indicate that Poland was a net exporter during the indicated years. 
Source: Eurostat (2018c). 
 
Box 1. The list of Poland’s energy policies since 1990 
Since the change of regime, Poland has had five energy policies. The first one was accepted in 
1990 (for the period up to 2010), followed by the second one in 1995 (also to 2010). The third 
energy policy was approved in 2000 (to 2020). This was evaluated and amended in 2002. In 
2005, the fourth energy policy (to 2025) was approved. The final, fifth one (to 2030) was 
approved in 2009. Currently, a new energy policy, the sixth one (to 2050) is being prepared. 
The first version of the draft energy policy was published in August 2014, while the last version 
dates to August 2015.12 However, in October 2015, the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party 
won the parliamentary elections in Poland, removing the ruling Civic Platform (PO) from 
power. The document was subsequently withdrawn and is being revised by the Ministry of 
Energy (IEA, 2017a: 24). There will probably be significant changes in the new energy policy 
that would otherwise have already been published (Ernest Wyciszkiewicz, email 
communication, 6 June 2018). As long as the new energy policy for the period up to 2050 is an 
ongoing project, the 2009 Polish Energy Policy until 2030 and the 2014 Strategy for Energy 
Security and Environment remain the two key strategic documents outlining Poland’s policy 
for the energy sector.13 
 
Electricity consumption continues to rise in Poland. The Polish Energy Policy until 
203014 predicted net electricity production (Table A5 in the Appendix), final electricity 
demand (Tables A1 and A4 in the Appendix), and final demand for network heat (Table 
A1 in the Appendix) to grow by 37, 55 and 50 per cent from 2006 to 2030, respectively 
(Ministry of Economy, 2009b: 11, 15). The draft Energy Policy until 2050 consists of 
several documents. One of them includes a variety of forecasts prepared by the Polish 
                                                 
12 The main forecasts for the Energy Policy until 2030 (Tables A1–A6) and the draft Energy Policy until 
2050 (Tables A7–A16) are presented in the Appendix. 
13 The 2014 Strategy for Energy Security and Environment identifies key reforms and necessary steps for 
cleaner energy and for safeguarding security of supply up to 2020 (Ministry of Economy/Ministry of 
Environment, 2014; IEA, 2017a: 24). In this paper, we focus on the Energy Policy until 2030 and the draft 
Energy Policy until 2050. 
14 A list of Polish energy policies is presented in Box 1. 
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National Energy Conservation Agency S.A. (Krajowa Agencja Poszanowania Energii S.A., 
KAPE), the Polish Energy Market Agency S.A. (Agencja Rynku Energii S.A., ARE) and the 
European Commission (Ministry of Economy, 2015c). Although the new draft Energy 
Policy is based on or follows none of these documents, the Ministry of Energy considers 
the forecasts made by the Polish National Energy Conservation Agency to be the most 
reliable (the Polish Ministry of Energy, email communication, 22 June 2018).15 
At end-2016, the installed electricity capacity in Poland amounted to 41.4 GW. The 
power sector has seen a substantial lack of investment (Berkenkamp et al., 2016: 1). 
Almost 59 per cent of the turbines are over 30 years old. Another ca. 16 per cent are 
more than 20 but less than 30 years old, while only the remaining 25 per cent are 
younger. The situation of the boilers in Poland is even more alarming (Wierzbowski et 
al., 2017: 51; Ministry of Economy, 2015b: 16). Therefore, since the estimated lifespan of 
such coal blocks is between 40 and 45 years, 6.4 GW of capacity will be lost by 2020, and 
the construction of new conventional generation with a capacity of at least 10-12 GW 
will be required by 2030 for the renewal of existing assets (Ministry of Economy, 2015b: 
16). Wierzbowski et al. (2017: 51) claim that by 2050, almost half of Poland’s installed 
capacity must be replaced. About 5 GW of power capacity must be commissioned by 
2020, a further 5 GW by 2030 and 9 GW by 2040. 
In this situation, it is predicted that issues with power shortages will begin to occur. 
In August 2015, the heat wave, lack of wind (needed for wind farms) and lack of rain 
(needed to cool coal-fired power plants) forced Poland to cut the electricity supply to 
industries, while electricity exports were also limited (Reuters, 2015). It was impossible 
to start up the cold reserve (Wierzbowski et al., 2017: 54). 
Another problem is related to the weak domestic electricity grid and 
interconnections, as well as the phenomenon of uncontrolled/unscheduled loop flows 
from Germany to Poland. The transmission network is old and the grid’s density is not 
even (Wierzbowski et al., 2017: 55). During the August 2015 crisis, the Polish state-
owned grid operator PSE claimed that the loop flow phenomenon had blocked imports 
from neighbouring countries (Schlandt, 2015). 
                                                 
15 The above forecasts are presented in the Appendix – for electricity production in Tables A9, A13 and A16, 
for heat production in Table A10, for electricity demand in Tables A11 and A14, and for heat demand in 
Table A12. 
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The Polish state maintains major shares in the four biggest energy companies, three 
of them – PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna S.A., Enea S.A. and Energa S.A. – are majority 
state-owned, while Tauron Polska Energia S.A. has minority state ownership. These four 
dominate the electricity market (Jankowska and Ancygier, 2017: 187). In Poland, energy 
policy has been used to strengthen the dominance of state-owned energy groups to the 
detriment of individuals and local communities (Szulecki et al., 2015: 16). 
At the time of the change of regime, Poland was almost completely a coal land 
(Szulecki, 2017: 7). More than two and a half decades later, at end-2016, hard coal still 
accounted for 46 per cent of installed electricity generation capacity, while lignite 
provided a further 23 per cent (Table 3) (Szulc, 2017). In 2016, solid fuels were 
responsible for 78.2 per cent of electricity generation, while 14.0 per cent of electricity 
generation was from renewables. The share of natural gas stood at only 4.7 per cent in 
2016, compared to 0.9 per cent in 2001 and 0.1 per cent in the early 1990s (Table 4) 
(Eurostat, 2018c). Similarly, in 2016, solid fuels provided more than 80 per cent of 
derived heat production.16 Natural gas had only about 7 per cent, while less than 5 per 
cent of the generation of heat was from renewables (Table 5) (Eurostat, 2018d). To place 
this data in a wider context, in 2016, solid fuels had a 49.1 per cent share in gross inland 
consumption, and an 18.1 per cent share in final energy consumption (Table 6) 
(Eurostat, 2018a). However, this heavy reliance on domestic coal is reflected in low 
energy (import) dependence. In 2015, with a 29.3 per cent energy dependency ratio, 
Poland was the fourth least dependent on energy imports behind Estonia (7.4%), 
Denmark (13.1%) and Romania (17.1%), while the EU stood at 54.1 per cent (Eurostat, 
2017). 
                                                 
16 The structure of space heating in residential buildings is as follows (2015 data): district heating – 41 per 
cent, solid fuel dual-purpose boilers – 23 per cent, solid fuel single-purpose boilers – 14 per cent, solid fuel 
stoves in rooms – 6 per cent, solid fuel fireplaces – 4 per cent, natural gas dual-purpose boilers – 7 per 
cent, natural gas single-purpose boilers – 2 per cent, fixed and portable electric radiators and electric 
underfloor heating – 2 per cent, other techniques – 1 per cent. The different types of warm water 
production in residential buildings include the following: district heating – 30 per cent, electric boiler or 
heater – 22 per cent, bathroom gas heater – 18 per cent, natural gas dual-purpose boiler – 8 per cent, solid 
fuel dual-purpose boiler or water heater – 18 per cent, other techniques – 1 per cent, no running warm 
water – 3 per cent (Ministry of Energy, 2017a). 
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Table 3. The share of different power plants in installed electricity generation capacity and electricity 
generation in Poland, 2016 (%) 
 Installed capacity (end-2016) Electricity generation (2016) 
Coal-fired utility power plants 46 50 
Lignite-fired utility power plants 23 32 
Gas-fired utility power plants 4 4 
Wind and other renewables 15 7 
Industrial plants 6 6 
Hydro utility power plants 6 1 
Total 100 100 
Source: Szulc (2017). 
 
Table 4. Gross electricity production in Poland, by fuel, 2004–2016 (%) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Solid fuels 91.5 90.4 90.9 90.4 89.4 87.9 86.6 85.5 83.0 83.7 81.4 79.1 78.2 
Gases 3.2 4.2 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.7 5.0 4.4 4.6 5.4 6.3 
   Natural gas 2.1 3.3 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.0 3.6 3.9 3.2 3.3 3.9 4.7 
   Derived gases 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 
Petroleum products 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.4 
Renewables 3.1 3.5 3.3 3.8 4.6 6.1 7.3 8.3 10.7 10.7 12.8 14.1 14.0 
   Biomass and  
   renewable waste 
3.1 3.5 3.3 3.8 4.6 6.1 7.3 8.3 10.7 10.7 12.8 14.1 14.0 
      Hydro 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.6 
      Wind 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.1 2.0 2.9 3.6 4.8 6.6 7.6 
      Solar PV         0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
      Renewable  
      municipal waste 
            0.0 
      Solid biofuels  
      excluding charcoal 
0.6 0.9 1.1 1.5 2.2 3.2 3.7 4.4 5.9 4.8 5.8 5.5 4.1 
      Biogas 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 
      Other liquid  
      biofuels 
     0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
Others 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
   Non-renewable  
   waste 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
   Heat from chemical 
   sources 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
   Other sources 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Solid fuels: hard coal, lignite and derivatives.  
Derived gases: coke oven gas, blast furnace gas and other recovered gases. 
Non-renewable waste: industrial and municipal waste. 
Note: Empty cells show zero values. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2018c). 
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Table 5. Derived heat production in Poland, by fuel, 2004–2016 (%) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Solid fuels 89.3 89.1 88.7 89.0 87.0 86.2 85.4 83.8 82.2 84.3 84.0 81.3 82.4 
Gases 7.7 7.8 8.3 7.5 9.0 8.5 9.2 10.0 9.9 8.8 9.0 12.2 10.9 
   Natural gas 6.2 6.2 5.7 5.6 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.7 6.0 6.0 7.2 7.2 
   Derived gases 1.5 1.6 2.6 1.9 2.9 2.3 3.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 3.1 5.0 3.7 
Petroleum products 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Renewables 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.6 3.2 3.2 4.5 6.2 5.3 5.2 4.6 4.8 
   Biomass and  
   renewable waste 
0.7 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.6 3.2 3.2 4.5 6.2 5.3 5.2 4.6 4.8 
      Solid biofuels 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.6 3.2 3.1 4.5 6.1 5.2 5.0 4.4 4.6 
      Biogas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
      Renewable 
      municipal waste 
          0.0 0.0 0.0 
      Liquid biofuels      0.0 0.0 0.0    0.0  
   Heat pumps      0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Others 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 
   Non-renewable 
   waste 
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 
   Heat from chemical 
   sources 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 
   Other sources 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Solid fuels: hard coal, lignite and derivatives.  
Derived gases: coke oven gas, blast furnace gas and gas works gas. 
Non-renewable waste: industrial and municipal waste. 
Note: Empty cells show zero values. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2018d). 
 
Table 6. The share of different energy sources in Poland’s energy balance, 2016 
 Total Solid fuels Oil Gas Renewables Wastes 
(non-ren.) 
Derived 
heat 
Electricity 
Gross inland 
consumption 
ktoe 99 930 49 079 26 535 14 633 8 769 742  172 
% 100.0 49.1 26.6 14.6 8.8 0.7  0.2 
Final energy 
consumption 
ktoe 66 652 12 069 21 627 9 688 5 540 637 5 669 11 422 
% 100.0 18.1 32.4 14.5 8.3 1.0 8.5 17.1 
Source: Eurostat (2018a) and own calculations. 
 
Table A5 in the Appendix presents forecasts from the Polish Energy Policy until 2030 
for net electricity production in Poland by fuel as follows: 
– The role of hard coal will fall from 58.3 per cent in 2006 to 32.4 per cent in 2025, 
but will again increase to 35.6 per cent by 2030. 
– The share of lignite will decline from 33.8 per cent in 2006 to 21.0 per cent in 2030. 
– In contrast, the share of natural gas will rise from 3.1 per cent in 2006 to a still very 
low 6.6 per cent in 2030. 
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– Also, the role of renewables will grow from 2.6 per cent in 2006 to 20.2 per cent by 
2025, but is expected to decrease to 18.8 per cent by 2030. 
– Finally, nuclear will enter the electricity generation mix and reach 15.7 per cent by 
2030. 
The August 2015 Energy Policy presented three scenarios for Poland’s energy mix: 
the sustainable or balanced scenario and two alternative scenarios (a nuclear scenario 
and a gas + renewables scenario). According to the sustainable scenario, coal will 
continue to be dominant in the energy balance, but with a decreasing share, while the 
share of other individual fuels/energy will be even and amount to around 15-20 per cent 
per fuel type, including an approximately 12 per cent share of nuclear energy through 
the construction of two nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6 GW. 
In contrast, the nuclear scenario is characterized by a 45-60 per cent share of nuclear 
energy in the energy balance, while other fuels/energy will provide roughly equal 
shares: hard coal and lignite – 10-15 per cent, crude oil – 10-15 per cent, natural gas – 
10-15 per cent, and renewables – approximately 15 per cent. 
The gas + renewables scenario is based on the assumption of large-scale domestic gas 
production from unconventional reservoirs, as well as the development of technologies 
for renewable energy production and energy storage. This scenario results from the fact 
that when the draft energy policy was written in 2014, there were still significant hopes 
for shale gas (Ernest Wyciszkiewicz, email communication, 6 June 2018). The scenario 
assumes that the share of natural gas and renewables in the energy balance will reach 
about 50-55 per cent, with hard coal and lignite – approximately 30 per cent, and crude 
oil – 15-20 per cent. The Energy Policy states that the “gas scenario”17 anticipates the 
share of renewables to be at a minimum of 20 per cent and of nuclear at approximately 
12 per cent.18 Under the gas + renewables scenario, the use of natural gas in the power 
industry would increase from around 3.5 per cent in 2013 to 20-30 per cent in 2050. 
The draft energy policy argues that gas and renewables complement each other nicely 
                                                 
17 This sentence in the Policy is confusing, because it uses the wording “gas scenario” and not 
“gas + renewables scenario”. 
18 In the first version of the draft Energy Policy, the gas + renewables scenario assumed the use of 
renewables to amount to at least 20 per cent and nuclear sources to reach a level of approximately 10 per 
cent (Ministry of Economy, 2014c: 39). 
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and gas would allow for flexible balancing.19 A significant increase in the use of gas in 
road transport is also expected (Ministry of Economy, 2015b: 40–46). This scenario, 
however, would require the further development of gas transportation infrastructure 
and storage. According to the draft Energy Policy, this would also signify searching for 
new gas suppliers as gas consumption would drastically increase (Wierzbowski et al., 
2017: 67–68). 
 
Coal. The coal industry has long established itself as a strategic element of the Polish 
industry and economy, leading to a path-dependency in energy policy that continuously 
reinforces the status quo aiming to maintain a conventional system based on fossil fuels, 
centralized production facilities and non-flexible consumption patterns (Jankowska and 
Ancygier, 2017: 186–187). 
It is necessary to make a differentiation between hard coal and lignite.20 Poland is the 
tenth largest hard coal producer in the world and the largest in Europe. The 
restructuring of hard coal mining in Poland started in 1990, but it has not been 
completed so far (Kamola-Cieślik, 2017). Meanwhile, hard coal production decreased 
from 151.3 million tonnes (mt) in 1990 to 66.5 mt in 2016. In the same period, the 
number of employees dropped from 416 thousand to about 85 thousand (PSG, 2017e), 
though hard coal mining is still indirectly responsible for an additional 300 thousand 
jobs (Adamczewski, 2015). In 2016, hard coal consumption amounted to 74.2 mt (PSG, 
2017f), while 8.3 mt of hard coal was imported, and exports stood at 9.1 mt. Importing 
hard coal to Poland is a relatively new phenomenon. For many years, Poland imported 
only those types of coal that it was not possible to obtain in the country (especially low 
phosphorus coking coal). It was only at the beginning of the 2000s that Poland started to 
import thermal (steam) coal. In 2008, for the first time, Poland imported more hard coal 
than it exported. Between 2008 and 2016, exports were higher than imports only in 
2013, 2015 and 2016 (PSG, 2017b). The largest import partner is Russia (Energetyka24, 
2017; Herold et al., 2017: 1). Thus, increasing coal imports could lead to higher Russian 
coal dependence, but this could be perceived differently than gas, since Russian coal 
imports can be replaced in their entirety in the event of a conflict (Baca-Pogorzelska, 
                                                 
19 As Stern (2017) notes, new coal stations are also able to provide backup electricity for renewables. 
20 For a detailed coal and coal product balance, see Table 7. 
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2018). Nonetheless, recently concern has been voiced over Poland’s increasing amount 
of (Russian) coal imports, and the Polish government plans to introduce import limits, 
despite the lack of sufficient domestic production. The aim of limiting imports is also 
included in the Programme for the hard coal mining sector in Poland, adopted in January 
2018. In addition, illegal anthracite coal imports coming indirectly from Donbas have 
become an issue of concern (TVN24 BiS, 2018; Łazarczyk, 2018; Miłosława Stępień, email 
communication, 14 August 2018). 
 
Table 7. Poland’s coal and coal product balance, 2016 (ktoe) 
 Solid 
fuels 
Anthracite Coking coal Other 
bituminous 
coal 
Lignite/ 
brown 
coal 
Patent 
fuels 
Coke 
oven 
coke 
Coal 
tar 
BKB 
Primary production 52 092   9 337 31 076 11 679         
From other sources  
(recovered products) 
216     216           
Imports 5 044 178 1 541 3 161 56 10 84 2 13 
Stock changes 2 648 -10 143 2 471 13   31     
Exports 10 921 12 1 700 4 071 41 2 4 745 347 2 
Gross inland cons. 49 079 156 9 321 32 852 11 706 8 -4 630 -345 11 
BKB – brown coal briquettes. Ktoe – thousand tonnes of oil equivalent. 
Source: Eurostat (2018a). 
 
Some domestic economic, social and political aspects of hard coal mining influencing 
the situation include the 85 thousand jobs, the strong unions and high state ownership 
level (Schwartzkopff and Schulz, 2017: 2, 5; Wierzbowski et al., 2017: 5–7). Among this 
sector’s major problems, we should count the high costs of mining, high social costs, low 
labour productivity, geological factors and issues with the quality of the product as 
compared to imported hard coal (Kamola-Cieślik, 2017: 254). Hard coal industry relies 
heavily on subsidies. Low international coal prices compared to domestic production 
costs have resulted in financial problems for hard coal mining. However, since mid-
2016, coal prices have been growing, though with high fluctuations. These increases 
follow a significant decline between 2011 and 2015 (Trading Economics, 2018). Also, as 
compared to gas, coal was cheap until 2016, but this is no longer true if it is bought in 
the international market (Jonathan Stern, email communication, 7 February 2018) 
(Table 8) (also, see Section 3.2.1). Under these circumstances, Poland’s Law and Justice 
government pledged to save and defend the coal industry, as well as modernising 
existing coal power plants and building new plants that would increase coal lock-in 
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(Wood et al., 2017: 3; Wierzbowski et al., 2017: 6.). In contrast, in 2017, a fundamental 
change was seen in the government’s rhetoric when the Minister of Energy at the time 
said that a particular project would be the last coal investment (Ciepiela, 2017; Reuters, 
2017a). Nonetheless, presented as part of the draft Energy Policy until 2050, the 2013 
forecasts of the Polish National Energy Conservation Agency suggest that despite some 
decrease in the share of hard coal in heat production (Table A10 in the Appendix), its role 
will remain extremely high, while its declining share in electricity generation will also 
continue to be untenably high (Table A9 in the Appendix). 
 
Table 8. Selected natural gas, coal and spot crude prices, 2004–2017 
 
LNG Natural gas Coal Crude oil 
Japan  
(cif) 
Average 
German 
import  
price (cif) 
UK 
(Heren 
NBP 
Index) 
US 
(Henry 
Hub) 
Northwest 
Europe 
marker price 
Brent spot 
prices 
USD per million Btu USD per tonne USD per barrel 
2004 5.18 4.30 4.46 5.85 72.08 38.27 
2005 6.05 5.83 7.38 8.79 60.54 54.52 
2006 7.14 7.87 7.87 6.76 64.11 65.14 
2007 7.73 7.99 6.01 6.95 88.79 72.39 
2008 12.55 11.60 10.79 8.85 147.67 97.26 
2009 9.06 8.53 4.85 3.89 70.66 61.67 
2010 10.91 8.03 6.56 4.39 92.50 79.50 
2011 14.73 10.49 9.04 4.01 121.52 111.26 
2012 16.75 10.93 9.46 2.76 92.50 111.67 
2013 16.17 10.73 10.64 3.71 81.69 108.66 
2014 16.33 9.11 8.25 4.35 75.38 98.95 
2015 10.31 6.72 6.53 2.60 56.64 52.39 
2016 6.94 4.93 4.69 2.46 60.09 43.73 
2017 8.10 5.62 5.80 2.96 84.51 54.19 
Btu – British thermal units. Cif – cost + insurance + freight (average prices). 
Source: BP (2019). 
 
As for lignite, Poland is the fourth producer worldwide and the second in the EU. 
Compared to hard coal, lignite production has remained relatively stable with certain 
fluctuations. Notwithstanding, it decreased from 69.2 mt in 1991 to 60.2 mt in 2016 
(Szczepiński, 2016; Kasztelewicz, 2018).21 Compared to 27 thousand in 1991, only ca. 10 
thousand people are now employed in lignite mining (Schwartzkopff and Schulz, 2017: 
5). Yet, reportedly, the sector indirectly employs 100 thousand people (Adamczewski, 
2015). Regarding the availability dimension, one should also highlight that in contrast to 
                                                 
21 Lignite has a much lower heating value than hard coal. 
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hard coal, lignite has minimal foreign trade (mainly limited to the Czech Republic, see 
PSG, 2017a), and lignite mining has more private ownership than in the hard coal sector. 
Almost all Polish lignite production is utilized for electricity generation by the five so-
called mine-mouth power plants, located close to the operating opencasts (Widera et al., 
2006: 154). Individual consumers have a very minor role. They primarily use lignite in 
heating. According to the January 2017 statement of the Polish Geological Institute, a 
sharp decline in lignite mining may occur already post-2022, unless lignite production 
from new deposits is added (PSG, 2017d). The president of the Polish Mining Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry argued in early 2018 that without exploiting further deposits, 
Poland would simply run out of lignite by 2030 (PSG, 2018). According to the Polish 
National Energy Conservation Agency, the role of lignite in electricity generation and 
heat production will drastically decrease in the first half of the 2030s and the first half of 
the 2040s, respectively (Tables A9 and A10 in the Appendix) (Ministry of Economy, 2015c: 
6). The affordability dimension is associated with the facts that lignite is cheaper than 
domestically sourced hard coal (Buchsbaum, 2018), and the cost of producing electricity 
from lignite is much lower than that of hard coal (Szczepiński, 2016; Szulc, 2017). 
However, regarding sustainability, lignite’s carbon dioxide emissions are higher. 
Sustainability issues linked to lignite mining include social conflicts when buying 
agricultural land from farmers for lignite opencasts (also associated with the 
resettlement of part of the rural population living in the area) and environmental 
impacts (noise and dust; changes in the geological and hydrogeological conditions in the 
area; and the creation of external dumps to store overburden) (Widera et al., 2006: 156). 
Honoré (2018b) claims that many coal plants (19 GW) do not comply with the standards 
of the EU’s 2010 Industrial Emissions Directive and while Poland has an exemption 
under the current EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) (Phase 3, 2013–2020), it has 
no derogations for Phase 4 of the ETS (2021–2030).22 
                                                 
22 Figure 2 shows carbon prices on the EU ETS. 
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Figure 2. European Union Emissions Trading System carbon market price day-by-day, 2008–2018 (EUR) 
 
Source: Sandbag Climate Campaign (2018). 
 
Poland was the fifth largest EU emitter of greenhouse gas (GHG) in 2015. GHG 
emissions in Poland decreased by 37 per cent between 1990 and 2002, but after 2002 
emissions grew by 3 per cent by 2015 (Herold et al., 2017). So far, Poland has failed to 
comply to air quality standards. In some places, especially in the south, air quality can 
periodically be worse than in Beijing and New Delhi, the world’s most polluted cities 
(Reuters, 2018c). In 2018, the European Commission took Poland to court over its slow 
response in addressing poor air quality caused by extensive coal and rubbish burning in 
homes (Koester and Barteczko, 2018). 
 
Renewables. As has been shown, from among the three dimensions, sustainability is 
clearly the most neglected in Poland.23 Because of energy independency targets and the 
aim of preserving coal-based electricity, Poland is a hard-line climate policy opponent. A 
global survey conducted in 2014 found 22 per cent of Poles, the highest rate among the 
countries surveyed, believed that climate change was not at all or probably not a threat 
to humanity (Global Challenges Foundation, 2014). It seems that Poland would not have 
promoted renewables if there had been no pressure from the EU. There has also been no 
strong bottom-up movement promoting the development of renewables (Szulecki et al., 
                                                 
23 Select thoughts on energy transition in presented in Box 2. 
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2015: 12–13, 15). Close links between the government and state-owned energy 
enterprises have hindered the development of renewables and strongly limited market 
access for small and medium-sized renewable energy companies (Jankowska and 
Ancygier, 2017: 183, 187). 
 
Box 2. Select thoughts on energy transition 
It is important to question whether the Polish government is aware of the dynamics of the 
energy transition process and whether it is capable of addressing the multiple complex 
problems it faces which require the application of completely new solutions. 
The electricity power generating system is Europe’s single biggest carbon dioxide emitting 
sector (European Climate Foundation, n.d.). The decarbonisation of the power sector means 
reducing its carbon intensity (LSE, 2014). Reduced carbon dioxide emissions per unit of 
electricity generated can be achieved in many ways. Most obviously, it can be done by 
switching to nuclear or renewables. However, burning natural gas instead of coal can also 
decarbonise to a high degree. In addition, to some extent, energy efficiency measures in power 
generation can help decarbonise without shifting to another energy carrier. If only the 
reduction of carbon dioxide emissions is the goal, then energy conservation in itself without 
efficiency improvements, supporting the use or loss of less electricity, can also be a tool. 
Another option is decarbonised natural gas (see Box 4). There are also several alternatives 
that can help decarbonise the heating (and cooling) sector. This can be done by (1) upgrading 
boilers, (2) developing micro combined heat and power (micro-CHP or mCHP) and fuel cell 
technology, or (3) switching to other forms of heating, including increasing the share of 
renewables. The latter can mean replacing fossil fuels with renewables (bio-energy, solar 
thermal, geothermal and heat pumps), installing hybrid heating systems (e.g. a gas-
condensing boiler with an electric heat pump), repurposing the gas network for renewable 
gases (see Box 4), and the electrification of the heating sector (heat pumps) (Honoré, 2018a: 
39–44). And, again, energy conservation in itself, without reducing heat intensity (e.g. 
installing better home insulation), can also cut carbon dioxide emissions in this sector. Stern 
(2017: 6) states that in the heating sector, non-hydrogen based solutions for decarbonising 
heat, such as electric heat pumps and district heating based on non-gas alternatives, are in the 
forefront of policy for many governments. Dickel (2018: 1) claims that it is essential to make 
the distinction between a carbon-free energy sector (which can include decarbonised fossil 
fuels) and a sustainable energy sector (which will have to be all renewable). 
There is a debate about whether the ongoing transition from the old model with baseload 
power provided by large, inflexible power plants towards a modern, flexible electricity system 
based on renewables can actually be executed. It requires a completely new approach. The 
main focus is on the availability and affordability of electricity from renewables. 
Due to the intermittency and variability of renewables, it is still widely believed that 
renewables, other than large hydro power plants, can only supplement the established 
electricity system and it is considered that there is an inherent upper limit on the share of 
renewables (Hinrichs-Rahlwes, 2013: 90). Among power plants based on non-renewable 
energy resources – such as fossil fuel power plants and nuclear power stations –, nuclear and 
coal-fired power plants typically provide baseload power, while natural gas is a much more 
flexible power, and can be an on-demand power source (Gonzalez-Salazar et al., 2018). 
Renewables are also different in terms of dispatchability. Wind power and solar photovoltaic 
(PV) power are non-dispatchable. The main argument used to justify nuclear energy is that it 
is, along with hydropower, the only low-carbon power source that can supply reliable 
baseload electricity on a large scale. In contrast, the advocates of the new model argue that 
energy generation with a dominant share of renewables that are flexible according to demand 
is feasible and supported by both practical experience and computer simulations (Diesendorf, 
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2016). Diesendorf (2016) discusses the four main conditions that make this possible. Firstly, 
the fluctuations in wind and solar PV can be balanced by flexible, dispatchable renewables, 
such as by hydropower with dams, open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs) fuelled by green gas (see 
Box 4) and concentrated solar thermal power (CSP) with thermal energy storage (TES). 
Secondly, one should rely on diverse renewables (i.e. multiple technologies and spreading out 
wind and solar PV farms geographically). Thirdly, new transmission lines may be needed to 
achieve this wide geographic distribution of renewables. Fourthly, smart demand 
management can shave the peaks in electricity demand and manage periods of low electricity 
supply. Smart meters and switches are controlled by both electricity suppliers and consumers, 
and programmed by consumers to switch off when demand on the grid is high and/or supply 
is low. Stern (2017: 6) warns that progress in relation to demand-side management would not 
only further reduce the problem of renewable intermittency, but also foster the need for 
backup from gas (or other fossil fuel) generation. 
As to the affordability dimension, data collected by the International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA) shows that the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) for bioenergy-for-power, 
hydropower, geothermal and onshore wind projects commissioned in 2017 was at the lower 
end of the LCOE range for fossil fuel options (IRENA, 2018: 16). Lazard (2017) states that “in 
some scenarios the full-lifecycle costs of building and operating renewables-based projects 
have dropped below the operating costs alone of conventional generation technologies such 
as coal or nuclear”. Meanwhile, attitudes towards nuclear energy have changed after Japan’s 
2011 Fukushima nuclear accident. The nuclear industry seems to be in trouble, primarily in 
the West, reflected in the French Areva’s virtual bankruptcy and the US Westinghouse’s 
bankruptcy proceedings. However, at the same time, Russian Rosatom has improved its 
performance (Minin–Vlček, 2018: 98). 
Another question centres on the future role of natural gas, the cleanest fossil fuel, which is 
discussed in Section 3.2. 
 
Nonetheless, there was a period during which an increase in the role of renewables 
occurred in Poland. The share of energy from renewables in gross final energy 
consumption was less than 7 per cent in the mid-2000s. Ten years later, in 2015, it 
reached close to 12 per cent; however, in 2016, its share decreased slightly (Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Share of energy from renewable sources and targets for 2020 in Poland, 2004–2016 (%) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2020 
target 
Share of 
energy from 
RES in GFEC 
6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.7 8.7 9.3 10.3 10.9 11.4 11.5 11.7 11.3 15*/ 
15.85** 
Share of 
electricity 
from RES in 
GOC 
2.2 2.7 3.0 3.5 4.4 5.8 6.6 8.2 10.7 10.7 12.4 13.4 13.4 19.13** 
Share of RES 
in heating  
and cooling 
10.2 10.2 10.2 10.5 10.9 11.5 11.7 13.1 13.4 14.1 14.0 14.5 14.7 17.05** 
Share of RES 
in transport 
1.4 1.6 1.7 1.6 4.0 5.3 6.6 6.8 6.5 6.6 6.2 5.6 3.9 10*/ 
10.14** 
RES – renewables. GFEC – gross final energy consumption. GOC – gross electricity consumption. 
* Target set by the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive of the European Parliament and Council. 
** Target set by the 2010 National Renewable Energy Action Plan of Poland. 
Source: Eurostat (2018e), Ministry of Energy (2010). 
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Box 3. EU targets for renewables, energy efficiency and GHG emissions cuts 
Climate change moved to the forefront of the EU’s agenda at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Solorio and Bocquillon, 2017: 24). The first EU target for renewables was set in the mid-
1990s. The European Commission’s 1996 Green Paper sought views on setting an indicative 
(not legally binding) objective of 12 per cent for the contribution of renewables to the EU’s 
gross inland energy consumption by 2010. The 1997 White Paper established this average 
indicative target for the EU, and member states were obliged to decide on their own specific 
objectives and develop their own national strategies to achieve them (Hinrichs-Rahlwes, 2017: 
xi; European Commission, 1996, 1997). The so-called Campaign for [Renewable Energy] Take-
Off started in 1999, aiming at accelerating the development of the renewables strategy in its 
early stages by the year 2003 (European Commission, 1999). The 2001 Renewables Electricity 
Directive set a 22.1 per cent indicative target for the share of electricity produced from 
renewables in the EU’s electricity consumption by 2010, while the annex included national 
indicative targets (European Parliament and Council, 2001). To promote the improvement of 
the energy performance of buildings within the EU, the first Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive was adopted in 2002, followed by the new directive in 2010 (European Parliament 
and Council, 2002, 2010). Another milestone was the 2003 Biofuels Directive that contained 
“reference values” of a 2 per cent market share for biofuels in transport in 2005 and a 5.75 per 
cent share in 2010 (European Parliament and Council, 2003). The March 2007 European 
Council Conclusions with its 20-20-20 targets made the EU a frontrunner and a role model for 
sustainable energy policies (Hinrichs-Rahlwes, 2017: xi). These binding 2020 targets included 
(1) a 20 per cent cut in GHG emissions compared with 1990, (2) a 20 per cent share of 
renewables in the total energy consumption underpinned by differentiated binding national 
targets for each member state, (3) a 20 per cent increase in energy efficiency and (4) a 
minimum share of at least 10 per cent of transport fuels from renewables. These targets were 
enacted in legislation in the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive, which entered into force in 
2010 (European Parliament and Council, 2009a; European Commission, n.d.-a, 2010). The 
directive for the first time comprised all three sectors – electricity, heating and cooling, and 
transport (Hinrichs-Rahlwes, 2017: xiii). The Energy Efficiency Directive was adopted in 2012. 
The EU’s long-term goal is to achieve GHG emission reductions of at least 80-95 per cent by 
2050 compared to 1990 levels. This was called for by the October 2009 European Council 
Conclusions and was also repeated by the Energy Roadmap 2050 in 2011 (Council of the 
European Union, 2009; European Commission, 2011). Nevertheless, the October 2014 
European Council Conclusions on the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework renounced its 
position as a leader in global renewables development. Member states closely linked to the 
incumbent fossil and nuclear energy system asked for ambitions to be lowered, no 2030 
targets at all, or for only a GHG reduction target. Finally, the European Council endorsed a 
binding EU target of an at least 40 per cent domestic reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 
compared to 1990, and a binding EU target of at least 27 per cent for the share of renewables 
consumed in the EU in 2030. Also, an indicative target at the EU level of at least 27 per cent 
was set for improving energy efficiency in 2030 compared to projections of future energy 
consumption based on the current criteria. Thus, the EU resigned from introducing binding 
national targets after 2020. Meaningful reforms of the EU ETS were also postponed (Hinrichs-
Rahlwes, 2017: xi; European Council, 2014a, 2014b). Finally, in May 2018, the Regulation on 
binding annual national emission reductions from 2021 to 2030 (the Effort Sharing 
Regulation) was adopted (Council of the European Union, 2018). In June 2018, the Parliament 
and the Council agreed that renewables should account for at least 32 per cent of the EU’s 
gross final consumption in 2030 (with an upwards revision clause by 2023), and that at least 
14 per cent of fuel for transport purposes must come from renewables by 2030 (European 
Parliament, 2018b, 2018d). Also, in June 2018, a binding energy efficiency target for the EU for 
2030 of 32.5 per cent, with a clause for an upwards revision by 2023 was reached between 
negotiators from the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council (European 
Commission, n.d.-e, 2018c). 
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In 2001, the Polish parliament adopted the Development Strategy for the Renewable 
Energy Sector and the Ministry of Economy developed an ordinance that set the 
minimum green electricity fraction at 7.5 per cent in the total electricity sales for 2010 
(Figorski–Gula, 2009: 418; Jankowska and Ancygier, 2017: 188). This was part of the 
Polish Accession Treaty (Frost & Sullivan and PAIiIZ, 2008). To support renewables 
development, the system of “Green Certificates” was introduced in 2005 by amending 
the 1997 Energy Law. A separate renewable energy law (the Renewables Act) was 
adopted only in February 2015. The National Renewable Energy Action Plan was 
adopted in 2010, but only six months later than required by the 2009 Renewable Energy 
Directive (Jankowska and Ancygier, 2017: 188–190). The Renewable Energy Directive 
specified a target of 15 per cent for the share of energy from renewables in gross final 
energy consumption to be achieved by 2020 (European Parliament and Council, 2009; 
Eurostat, 2016). This is higher than Poland initially (11%) and eventually (13%) 
proposed. In contrast, Poland was successfully against binding renewables targets for 
2030 during the meeting of the October 2014 European Council. The National 
Renewable Energy Action Plan includes the 2020 target of 15.85 per cent, and not 15 per 
cent. The 2009 Energy Policy believed that the 2020 target is feasible on condition of the 
accelerated development of all types of renewables, in particular wind energy, but it did 
not believe a 20 per cent share was possible by 2030 (Table A2 in the Appendix) 
(Ministry of Economy, 2009b: 13). Poland’s 2010 National Renewable Energy Action Plan 
would achieve its 2020 EU goal through the development of wind energy, biomass co-
firing and the building of one additional large hydropower plant, suggesting further 
reliance on huge conventional power companies (Jankowska and Ancygier, 2017: 190–
192). According to the Polish Institute for Renewable Energy (IEO), the development of 
renewables between 2006 and 2015 was based on relatively cheap bank financing and a 
growing share of corporate financing, but these sources of funding have begun to shrink, 
and unpaid loans to finance renewables projects, mainly wind, have already reached 
PLN 11 billion. Banks complain about the lack of a broader perspective (for a 25-year 
framework) in state policy, the legal instability, as well as the various ad hoc and not 
always well-thought-out regulations (IEO, 2018). 
In Poland, GHG emissions dropped by 20 per cent in just over two years between 
1988 and 1990. This rapid drop was followed by a slower 20 per cent decline from 1990 
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to 2014. Carbon dioxide is the largest GHG, contributing 82 per cent of Poland’s total 
emissions in 2014 (IEA, 2017a: 24). The 2015 draft National Programme for the 
Development of a Low-Emission Economy aims for a 44 per cent carbon dioxide 
emissions reduction by 2050 compared to the 2010 level (Ministry of Economy, 2015a). 
Regarding binding national targets by the EU for the period 2021–2030 for sectors not 
covered by the EU ETS, Poland was against its 7 per cent cut in GHG emissions by 2030 
as compared to 2005, despite allocation of the fourth smallest goal among EU member 
states (see the Effort Sharing Regulation in Box 3) (European Commission, 2016, n.d.-c, 
n.d.-d; European Parliament and Council, 2016, 2018; European Parliament, 2018a, 
2018c). 
In the 2000s and 2010s, a fundamental restructuring of the role of different 
renewables occurred in renewable electricity generation. Before 2007, hydropower 
ranked first. From 2007 to 2014, solid biofuels (biomass) played the most significant 
role. In 2015, wind power came in first, after becoming the second largest renewable 
power source in 2011. The role of solar energy is still almost invisible (Table 10). 
 
Table 10. The share of renewable sources in renewable electricity generation in Poland, 2004–2016 (%) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Hydro 65.2 55.6 48.6 41.8 33.6 26.4 22.7 18.3 13.9 13.8 11.9 10.7 10.5 
Wind 3.7 5.3 7.2 9.9 12.7 13.4 16.4 22.7 26.6 35.8 38.0 44.0 53.6 
Solar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 
Solid biofuels 28.4 36.3 40.7 44.6 49.9 56.5 57.0 55.5 56.2 46.3 46.0 41.0 30.8 
All other renewables 2.7 2.9 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.5 3.3 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: Hydro is normalised and excludes pumping. Wind is normalised. Solar includes solar photovoltaics 
and solar thermal generation. The other renewables include electricity generation from gaseous and 
liquid biofuels, renewable municipal waste, geothermal, and tide, wave and ocean. Grey cells indicate the 
renewable source with the highest share. 
Source: Eurostat (2018b). 
 
The availability dimension of hydropower relates to Poland’s scarce water resources, 
due to its geographical position (low rainfall and high evaporation rates). Thus, the 
potential for hydropower production in Poland is low, and it has been utilised to a 
limited extent. It does not exceed 12 per cent of the hydropower technical potential 
(Majewski, 2013: 52–53). Hydropower had long been a major contributor to renewables 
simply because other renewables were performing badly. Over 75 per cent of the 
potential is in the Vistula catchment area. The Vistula River itself represents half of the 
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Polish potential. Oder with its tributaries contributes to the total with a further 20 per 
cent (Steller, 2012: 1).24 According to Majewski (2013: 45, 53), all Polish strategic 
development documents refer to the need to increase the retention storage capacity for 
the water reservoirs, which would result in substantial opportunities for electricity 
generation. Obstacles include the overly restrictive environmental law and lack of 
political will. The sustainability dimension focuses on land use and wildlife impacts. In 
addition, calculations suggest the life-cycle emissions of hydropower plants can be 
relatively high (Union of Concerned Scientists, n.d.-a). 
Biomass co-firing had long been profitable due to the old Green Certificate system. 
Biomass imports were also given a boost, which increased Poland’s dependency 
(Szulecki et al., 2015: 15–16; Wierzbowski et al., 2017: 58). This affected the availability 
dimension of supply security. Regarding the sustainability dimension, replacing coal 
with biomass theoretically results in reduced carbon emissions, since, by law, burning 
wood is “carbon neutral” as the emitted pollution is reabsorbed by newly planted trees. 
In fact, GHG emissions from energy generated using biomass are generally lower than 
those from fossil fuels, but not always.25 Similarly, biogas represents a carbon-neutral 
fuel source, since carbon emitted by its combustion is equal to the amount of carbon that 
was absorbed from the atmosphere during plant growth. Regarding this issue, in June 
2018, the European Academies’ Science Advisory Council (EASAC) published a 
commentary to highlight that “the concept of all bioenergy being carbon-neutral is too 
simplistic and does not offer any general context-independent justification to increase 
forest utilisation”. EASAC claims that the so-called payback period (the time needed for 
forests to reabsorb the carbon dioxide emitted during biomass combustion) ranges from 
decades to hundreds of years (EASAC, 2018). The distance for biomass transportation 
and imports to the energy plants also largely contribute to global warming potential and 
other environmental impacts (Bowyer, 2012). Further, co-firing decreases the efficiency 
and lifetime of boilers that were principally designed for coal use (Wierzbowski et al., 
2017: 57–58). 
                                                 
24 There are also some pumped-storage power plants in Poland. 
25 According to the UK Environment Agency, using short rotation coppice chips to generate electricity can 
produce 35 to 85 per cent less emissions per unit of delivered energy than a combined cycle gas turbine 
power station, while using straw cans, in some cases, produces over 35 per cent more (Bates et al., 2009). 
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The Green Certificate mechanism did not set different prices for different renewable 
technologies (Jankowska and Ancygier, 2017: 189). It treated all energy sources the same 
and did not take into consideration their environmental impact and development 
potential (Szulecki et al., 2015: 13). Szulecki et al. (2015: 14) claim that (old large) 
hydropower plants and (inefficient) coal-fired power plants burning biomass belonged 
to the main beneficiaries of the Green Certificate support mechanism. Onshore wind, and 
thus foreign investors, also benefitted (Szulecki et al., 2015: 15). The 2015 Renewables 
Act introduced a new auction system starting from 2016 (the first auction took place on 
30 December 2016), though it maintained the Green Certificate system for the existing 
renewable installations with restrictions. 
When evaluating the availability dimension of the Polish onshore wind sector, we 
concentrate on Poland’s wind potential and equipment/technology imports. Poland’s 
wind conditions are relatively ideal for wind energy development, though they vary 
regionally and are thus uneven. The northern and central regions are distinctly the most 
favourable (Hajto et al., 2017). Poland’s installed wind power capacity increased from 
only 18 MW at end-2001 to 6.36 GW at end-2016 and 6.40 GW at end-2017 (Statista, 
2018), with this last figure showing a halt in the growing trend. Due to the spectacular 
rise observed until 2016, Poland has the seventh largest wind power capacity in the EU. 
However, taking effect in mid-2016, a new Act on investments in wind power plants, the 
Wind Farm Investment Act (also called the Distance Act) introduced restrictions in its 
development due mainly to citizens’ complaints about noise from wind farms (Reuters, 
2016), which is also part of the sustainability dimension. Instead, the Law and Justice 
government stated its preference for geothermal energy or biomass. Nonetheless, 
geothermal has not yet been developed to any significant extent. There were 
speculations that the new situation could give an advantage to coal-fired power 
(Kowalski, 2016). As growth in renewables had been driven by wind energy over the 
previous few years, it became questionable how Poland would achieve the target of 15 
per cent renewable energy in gross final energy consumption without growth in wind 
generation. Certainly, a new wave of biomass co-firing or biogas usage could help reach 
the target (Easton, 2016). However, in the summer of 2018, the 2015 Renewables Act 
and the 2016 Wind Farm Investment Act were, to some extent, relaxed to encourage 
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onshore and offshore wind development (ICIS, 2018; Renewables Now, 2018; Richard, 
2018). 
End-2015 data suggest that the majority of onshore wind farm projects are owned by 
so-called independent power producers (IPPs). Approximately 19 per cent of installed 
capacity is in the hands of state-owned companies. At end-2015, the Danish 
manufacturer Vestas enjoyed the leading position (38%) among manufacturers with the 
highest installed capacity in Poland, followed by the Spanish Gamesa (now Siemens 
Gamesa) (14%) and the American GE (13%) in second and third place, respectively 
(PSEW, 2016). Used wind turbines have been imported from Germany and Denmark 
(Friends Against Wind, 2016). In its annual report, the Polish Wind Energy Association 
(PSEW) complained in 2017 that the provisions of the Wind Farm Investment Act would 
prevent the modernization of existing wind farms failing to meet the minimum distance 
requirement, i.e. in 99 per cent of cases. If there is no possibility of installing new 
technical wind turbine elements, this will encourage importing used wind turbine 
components (PSEW, 2017: 47). 
Poland has no offshore wind energy (Offshore Wind Journal, 2017), but the outlook is 
hopeful for the period after 2020. According to McKinsey & Company (2016), Poland has 
the potential to become a leader in the development of offshore wind power for which 
the Baltic Sea offers favourable conditions. It believes that building 6 GW of capacity by 
2030 is feasible. In contrast, the Polish Foundation for Sustainable Energy (FNEZ) stated 
in early 2018 that Poland could have 4 GW of installed offshore wind capacity in the 
Baltic Sea by end-2030 and 8 GW by end-2035 (Offshore Wind, 2018). WindEurope, 
formerly the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), has three scenarios leading up 
to 2030 – a central scenario with 3.2 GW, a low scenario with 2.2 GW, and a high 
scenario with 6 GW (WindEurope, 2018b: 26). In April 2018, the president of the Polish 
state-owned grid operator PSE confirmed their support for offshore wind when he 
claimed that 4 GW of offshore wind could be installed (i.e. PSE is capable of connecting 
such capacity to its power grid) by 2026/2027 with up to 8 GW in the longer term 
(O’Brian, 2018; Petrova, 2018). To put these numbers into perspective, Europe had a 
total installed offshore wind capacity of 15.8 GW at end-2017, of which the UK 
represented 43 per cent (6.8 GW) (WindEurope, 2018b: 18). Offshore wind projects 
would benefit from the release of a draft plan for spatial development in Polish waters 
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(Renewables Now, 2018). The availability dimension of offshore wind energy supply 
security also includes the issue of reliance on foreign technology/equipment. However, 
recent years have brought about significant changes in this respect. Poland has become a 
strong player in the supply chain with major investments in the manufacturing of 
turbine foundations and the cranes and jack-up vessels used in installation and 
maintenance. The Polish wind industry provides 12 thousand jobs. The president of the 
Polish Wind Energy Association (PWEA) claimed in April 2018 that Polish companies 
could deliver up to 50 per cent of the components required to build offshore wind farms 
(WindEurope, 2018a). 
Solar photovoltaic energy was almost non-existent before 2014, but it has grown 
considerably since 2015. More than 29 thousand solar systems with a cumulative 
capacity of 281.4 MW were installed in Poland by end-2017, the majority of which are 
micro-installations not exceeding 40 kW. Out of the 29 thousand solar systems, 589 
systems with a total capacity of 107.7 MW were licensed by the Polish Energy 
Regulatory Office (Pietruszko, 2018). As in the case of wind energy, the availability 
dimension of solar energy supply security consists of both the amount of solar radiation 
and technology imports. Poland has about 1,600 sunshine hours per year, and the 
average solar irradiation on horizontal surfaces is approximately 1,080 kWh/m2 
(Renewable Market Watch, 2016). Thus, Poland has solar exposure conditions similar to 
those of Germany, a world leader in terms of PV capacity (Majewski and Szymanek, 2012: 
21). As seen, the availability dimension is also affected by the dependence on technology 
imports. Most recent data show that 60 per cent of PV modules come from Polish 
producers, while the rest is imported. In 2016, China had the largest share in imports 
(36.3%), followed by Germany (24.8%). The share of the US fell significantly in favour of 
Germany. For the first time, at some point in 2016, the average wholesale prices of 
German PV modules were lower than the Chinese ones. Polish exports consisted of both 
modules produced by Polish producers (OEM modules), but also modules that Polish 
companies imported and then exported. The Netherlands (OEM exports), Belarus and 
Ukraine were the main export directions (IEO, 2017: 6, 20). As to sustainability, the 
environmental impacts of solar power include land use in the case of large utility-scale 
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PV and CSP projects, CSP water use for cooling purposes26 and hazardous materials 
resulting from the PV cell manufacturing process (Union of Concerned Scientists, n.d.-
b).27 
As already discussed, non-fossil-fuel power technologies also induce life-cycle GHG 
emissions. However, according to Pehl et al. (2017), life-cycle emissions from solar, 
wind and nuclear power are many times lower than from coal or gas with carbon 
capture and storage or sequestration (CCS, see Box 4). Though highly uncertain and 
variable, life-cycle emissions from hydropower and bioenergy are substantial, and 
comparable in scale to those generated by fossil fuel carbon capture and storage 
plants (higher than from gas CCS, but lower than from coal CCS) (Evans, 2017). 
Sustainability questions also arise in the case of intermittent energy that is dependent 
on backup power or energy storage. In the old model, backup power is derived from the 
combustion of fossil fuels, typically natural gas, which cause GHG emissions. However, 
energy storage also increases emissions. 
In summary, Poland has chosen to increase the share of renewables in the power 
system at the lowest possible cost. Almost all of the money has gone to either big energy 
companies or large foreign investors. Until recently, job creation from renewables has 
largely been a missed opportunity (Szulecki et al., 2015: 15), though, as described above, 
changes have recently occurred. Jankowska and Ancygier (2017: 199) find that 
renewable policies have been designed in ways that do not affect the role of the 
conventional power industry or which at least try to minimize these changes. 
 
Nuclear energy. Poland has no nuclear capacity, although plans for the development 
of this sector have been in place for decades. In 1982, construction began near the 
village of Żarnowiec, close to Gdańsk, but it was halted in 1990 during the democratic 
transition due to widespread public opposition. One and a half decades later, the 2005 
Energy Policy until 2025 confirmed the intention to have the first nuclear power plant in 
operation by 2021 or 2022 (Latek, 2005; Ministry of Economy, 2009a: 54). More or less 
                                                 
26 Compared to GHG emissions, far less attention is paid to the water footprint. Water is used (1) as a 
source that is converted to steam to turn turbines (a working fluid); (2) for flue gas desulfurization in coal 
facilities; (3) for cooling; and (4) for cleaning. Water is also used for growing energy crops for biopower 
facilities. For the water consumption of different types of power plants, see Macknick et al. (2012). 
27 There are no CSP projects in Poland. 
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in the same period, in 2006, Lithuania invited Poland to join its project of building a new 
nuclear power plant in Lithuania, despite Latvia and Estonia being opposed to Poland’s 
involvement. Later, the Baltic states agreed to discuss cooperation with Poland, and in 
2007, it was announced that Poland would indeed participate (World Nuclear 
Association, 2017). However, this regional project was stalled (The Baltic Course, 2016). 
Meanwhile, in January 2009, a resolution was adopted to develop the Polish Nuclear 
Energy Programme, followed in November 2009 by the adoption of the Polish Energy 
Policy until 2030, which supported the addition of nuclear power to the national energy 
mix (Gawlikowska-Fyk and Nowak, 2014: 16; Ministry of Economy, 2009a). The energy 
policy assumed the first nuclear block would be constructed by 2020. By 2030, three 
nuclear blocks with a total net capacity of 4.5 GW (gross capacity of 4.8 GW) would be in 
operation (Ministry of Economy, 2009b: 15). In January 2009, the Polish government 
designated the state-owned PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna S.A., Poland’s largest power 
producer, as responsible for the set-up and implementation of the nuclear programme. 
Therefore, first, in December 2009, PGE Energia Jądrowa (PGE EJ) S.A. was established, 
and then, in 2010, PGE EJ 1 Sp. z o.o., as a special-purpose vehicle, was founded with 51 
per cent equity from PGE EJ S.A. and 49 per cent from PGE S.A. (PGE, 2011; World 
Nuclear Association, 2018). After years of negotiations, it was only in 2014 that PGE S.A. 
concluded a shareholders’ agreement with Enea, KGHM Polska Miedź, Tauron Polska 
Energia (as mentioned earlier, the first is a majority state-owned Polish company, while 
the other two are minority state-owned) for the sale of 10 per cent interest in PGE EJ 1 
to each new party (PGE, 2014). Also, in 2014, the Polish Nuclear Energy Programme was 
approved. It aimed to build two nuclear power plants with a capacity of approximately 3 
GW each. The first unit of the first nuclear power plant was expected to be online by 
2025, while the other units by 2035 (Ministry of Economy, 2014b). The draft Polish 
Energy Policy until 2050 in essence simply repeats these deadlines. The first unit with a 
capacity of 1.5 GW should be commissioned in 2024, while the combined capacity of 6 
GW should be reached sometime between 2030 and 2035. As described, all three 
scenarios of the draft Energy Policy until 2050 are partly constructed around nuclear 
energy: the sustainable scenario – around 12 per cent, the nuclear scenario – 45-60 per 
cent, and the gas + renewables scenario – approximately 12 per cent. A 45-60 per cent 
share, however, would require huge nuclear capacity, much more than 6 GW. 
Nevertheless, so far no decision has been taken on whether to build the first nuclear 
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plant. In addition, it has not been decided how the project will be funded (Wood et al., 
2017: 5). In April 2017, Poland’s energy minister stated that the first 1.2-GW nuclear 
power station could be built by around 2030 (Reuters, 2017b, 2017c). In September 
2017, the same minister noted that they wanted to build three units in five-year 
intervals, with the first one by 2029 (Reuters, 2017a). In March 2017, the Polish daily 
Rzeczpospolita reported that the European Commission proposed Poland should include 
nuclear power in its mix, targeting 3.3 GW by 2035 and eventually 8.2 GW by 2050.28 In 
February 2018, PGE said it was ready to cooperate with more partners – not long after 
state-run Polish oil refiner PKN Orlen stated that it was examining the nuclear project 
(Reuters, 2018b). In May 2018, PGE decided to abandon its role and to instead focus 
investments on offshore wind energy. At the same time, media reported sources as 
saying PKN Orlen might take on PGE’s role as the party responsible for the execution of 
investment in Poland’s first nuclear power plant (Barteczko and Goraj, 2018). However, 
in May 2018, Poland’s energy minister confirmed that the three minor investors would 
not take part in the project, adding that there was no decision that PGE would withdraw 
from the project and that he wanted PGE to maintain its leading role (Poland in English, 
2018; PolskieRadio.pl, 2018). 
Wood et al. (2017: 4) claimed that Poland was considering using the construction of 
nuclear power plants as one of its arguments in negotiations with the European 
Commission over capacity market emission performance standards. In March 2017, the 
Polish energy minister believed that adding nuclear power to the energy mix along with 
the development of renewables would improve Poland’s bargaining position in talks 
with the European Commission and allow for the longer use of coal-fired power plants 
(Warsaw Voice, 2017). 
In the case of nuclear energy, the geopolitical influencing factor is linked to 
technological reliance. These considerations exclude the use of Russian technology at a 
time when Rosatom has improved its performance (see above) (Minin–Vlček, 2018). In 
November 2015, it was reported that five players – the American Westinghouse, the 
Japanese GE Hitachi, the Canadian SNC-Lavalin Nuclear, the French Areva and EDF, and 
the South Korean KEPCO – had expressed interest in participating in a tender for the 
                                                 
28 According to this source, wind farms should reach 18.8 GW, while the share of coal should gradually 
decline as lignite is eliminated from the energy mix (Warsaw Voice, 2017). 
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construction of Poland’s nuclear power plant (World Nuclear Association, 2018). The 
availability dimension of nuclear energy supply security points to the availability of 
nuclear fuel in sufficient quantities at the site of the nuclear power plant and the 
possibility of diversifying nuclear fuel for the selected type of reactors. These issues, 
however, cannot be evaluated at such an early stage in the planning process. The 
affordability dimension requires finding a financing model, producing a positive return 
on investment, and not being classified by the European Commission as illegal state aid 
(Gawlikowska-Fyk and Nowak, 2014: 30). The sustainability dimension is supported by 
the very small amount of emissions to the atmosphere, while problems are centred on 
safety and nuclear waste management. Persistent safety concerns have intensified since 
the Fukushima disaster, though nuclear energy is safer than generally believed 
(Breakthrough Institute, 2013). Heinrich et al. (2016: 3) find that nuclear energy is 
presented in the Polish media as an answer to Poland’s energy dependence problems. 
According to Heinrich et al., from the security point of view, the referent object is the 
nuclear project itself, and the two key threats or challenges are low societal acceptance 
of nuclear energy and mounting investment costs. Therefore, the Polish government 
launched a substantial media campaign. Recent opinion polls indicate that Poles support 
the construction of a nuclear power plant (World Nuclear News, 2017). On the other 
hand, regarding an energy policy to “be primarily conducted in Poland in the near 
future”, a 2013 poll shows that 70 per cent of Polish people want an energy policy 
supporting the development of renewables, compared to only 18 per cent for coal and 
16 per cent for nuclear energy (Greenpeace, 2013). 
 
3.2. Case study 2: Poland’s gas diversification 
 
3.2.1. The role of (Russian) gas in Europe 
The future of gas is being disputed in Europe. It is questioned whether (1) natural gas 
can have a future as a bridge or transition fuel displacing or, more precisely, substituting 
coal until renewables enter the sector on a massive scale, first complementing 
renewables, and then becoming a sunset fuel (van Foreest, 2011); or whether (2) it can 
be a destination fuel, i.e. a significant part of a low-carbon energy balance; or if (3) it is a 
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fuel with no future; or if (4) it can be part of the carbon-free energy future as 
decarbonised natural gas in the form of hydrogen by natural gas steam reforming (see 
the last in Box 4). 
 
Box 4. Natural gas decarbonisation 
The decarbonisation of natural gas can principally take two forms. Firstly, it seems the most 
frequently discussed method is the post-combustion decarbonisation of natural gas through 
CCS, during which carbon dioxide is separated from the flue gas and then stored in geological 
formations (reservoirs), though this technology is still at an early stage (van Foreest, 2011: 
15). Secondly, the pre-combustion decarbonisation of natural gas through natural gas 
reforming (steam methane reforming or SMR) to acquire hydrogen is another possible path 
and a solution allowing for the further use of the existing resource base and related 
infrastructure (Dickel, 2018: 2–3). SMR is the cheapest and most often used way to produce 
hydrogen (HydrogenTrade.com, n.d.). Although the combustion of hydrogen with oxygen 
produces water as its only product, carbon monoxide and then (in a subsequent step) carbon 
dioxide are also generated during the SMR process. These substances should also be captured 
and stored in geological formations, which is the most difficult problem linked to natural gas 
conversion to hydrogen (Stern, 2017: 6). Among others, hydrogen can also be produced by the 
electrolysis of water by using electricity from renewable sources (power-to-gas). Further, 
hydrogen can be created by coal and biomass gasification, biological production, liquid 
reforming and other processes (HydrogenTrade.com, n.d.; Gleason, 2013: 149; DOE, n.d.). 
According to IGU (2009: 26), about half of the global hydrogen production is from natural gas, 
30 per cent is from oil, and most of the rest is from coal. Water electrolysis, contrary to 
widespread belief, accounts for only 4 per cent. IGU believes that manufacturing hydrogen 
from natural gas remains the best option until at least 2030. As seen, in the case of post-
combustion decarbonisation of natural gas through CCS and pre-combustion decarbonisation 
of natural gas through SMR and CCS, natural gas is still used as feedstock. Stern (2017: 24) 
argues that only CCS with hydrogen distribution provides a solution for large-scale natural gas 
decarbonisation. According to IGU (2009: 25), it may be possible to transport in excess of 30 
per cent hydrogen in existing high-pressure transmission networks, but because of the age 
and thus the state of many domestic appliances, the maximum allowed percentage may turn 
out to be 10 per cent or less. 
Besides pre-combustion and post-combustion CCS, there is a third primary carbon dioxide 
capture system, called oxy-fuel combustion. In the oxygen-combustion process, air is replaced 
by oxygen to combust the fossil fuel (Li, 2016: 14–15). CCS to power stations, especially in the 
heating sector, has made limited progress (Stern, 2017: 13). According to the Global CCS 
Institute (2017: 28), there were 17 large-scale CCS projects in operation around the world at 
end-2017: nine in the US, three in Canada, two in Norway, and one in Brazil, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates each. Only two projects are related to power generation. Both are 
with a coal-fired power plant. One is with Unit 3 of the Boundary Dam in Estevan in Canada, 
while the other is with Unit 8 of Petra Nova in Thompsons, Texas. The industrial structure of 
the remaining CCS projects is the following: natural gas processing – eight, hydrogen 
production and fertiliser production – two-two, chemical production, iron and steel 
production and synthetic natural gas – one for each. As indicated, in Europe, there are only 
two large-scale projects in operation. In Norway, two gas fields, the Sleipner and the Snøhvit, 
produce natural gas with higher carbon dioxide content. It is stripped, collected and stored in 
geological formations deep underground (called industrial separation) (Global CCS Institute, 
n.d.). 
Under certain conditions, a natural gas grid can also be used in the case of gases of 
biological origin. In this paper, we distinguish these from natural gas decarbonisation, because 
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here the feedstock is not natural gas. These renewable gases can be produced by either 
anaerobic digestion (biogas) or gasification (bio syngas). Biogas (as a raw gas) can be purified 
to biomethane, while bio syngas can either be methanised to achieve a bio-substitute or bio-
synthetic natural gas (bio-SNG) or it can be reformed into bio-hydrogen. Biomethane can also 
be used as a gaseous biofuel (biomethane vehicle fuel), for which it must be compressed (also 
called compressed biogas/biomethane – CBG, or bio-compressed natural gas – bio-CNG) (IGU, 
2012: 8–9, 14–15). EBA (European Biogas Association) data suggest that there were at least 
17 376 biogas plants in Europe at end-2015 (Biogas barometer, 2017: 5). Biogas can also be 
combusted to produce heat and/or power locally (IGU, 2009: 29). According to the think tank 
France Biométhane and Sia Partners consultancy, which monitors nine European countries, 
the sector had some 480 plants injecting biomethane into Europe’s natural gas grids at end-
2016 (Biogas barometer, 2017: 6). The production of biomethane in Europe is only about 2 
bcma (Honoré, 2018a: 43), and biogas growth is slowing due to policy revisions in Germany 
and Italy (Stern, 2017: 11). 
 
European gas demand has failed and will continue to fail to meet previous gas 
industry expectations. Based on temperature-corrected data, the period of gas demand 
expansion ended in the mid-2000s, followed by a three-year long plateau and then a 
period of decline until 2015 (Stern, 2017: 1). Since then, however, some growth has been 
observed. Although Henderson and Sharples (2018: 2, 8) indicate the surprisingly rosy 
image of rising gas demand owing to the accelerating shift away from coal in the power 
sector, the phase-out of nuclear plants and delays in new nuclear plants, Stern (2017: 3–
4) highlights fundamental problems, including (1) the lack of traction of gas advocacy 
messages promoting gas in relation to its environmental advantages; (2) the issue with 
the price competitiveness of gas between 2011 and 2014 with lasting damage to the 
commercial image of gas in many countries (Table 8); (3) a coal and renewables 
paradigm in the power generation sector led by the gas price competitiveness problem; 
(4) low carbon prices (Figure 2); (5) cost reduction and technological advancement in 
the field of renewables and electricity storage; and (6) political controversy surrounding 
the import of Russian gas.  
Deák (2017) highlights that Russia has played a significant role in natural gas not 
being incorporated into the EU’s decarbonisation policies, due to the negative image 
associated with gas as a result of the January 2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis and 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014. Thus, in contrast to the original concept of gas as a 
bridge or transition fuel, it has not become part of the sustainable fuel pool, rather 
occupying a back-up position as the second best option if the primary policy targets fail. 
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Nonetheless, from a Russian perspective, the European era of growing gas exports 
has not yet ended, but there is a major shift from demand growth to import increase 
expectations in Europe (Deák, 2017). After mixed but limited results between 2009 and 
2015, including very low levels of exports in 2009, 2010 and 2012, Gazprom 
unexpectedly delivered record volumes of gas to Europe in 2016 and 2017 due to (1) 
lack of competition from other suppliers because of delays in new LNG start-ups, higher 
LNG demand in Asia and problems with other pipeline gas suppliers (including Algeria); 
(2) higher coal prices mainly owing to increasing Chinese coal imports; (3) the decline in 
European indigenous production as a consequence of older, more mature fields in the 
North Sea and serious problems at the Groningen field in the Netherlands; (4) the 
rebound in European gas demand driven by the European economic recovery, cold 
winter temperatures and increased coal-to-gas switching (following the higher coal 
prices and significant rise in the carbon price in Europe); and (5) the change in 
Gazprom’s pricing strategy in response to demands from customers and pressure from 
the European Commission through the Third Energy Package and the DG COMP 
investigation (Henderson and Sharples, 2018). 
Russia’s share has increased in the European gas market and could approach 40 per 
cent in the foreseeable future (Henderson and Sharples, 2018: 1). While the political 
perspective is that Russian gas’s market dominance is the most important security 
problem for European gas markets, the gas perspective points to (1) the decline in 
European conventional gas production; (2) the failure to diversify pipeline gas supplies 
and uncertainty about the duration of the ongoing LNG supply surplus; and (3) the rising 
gas prices in Europe in the case of any restriction of Russian gas supplies (Stern, 2017: 
9–10). According to Henderson and Sharples (2018: 26), irrespective of political risks, 
the forecasted increase in Russia’s share raises the question of over-dependence and 
presents a security of supply issue for European policy-makers in purely commercial 
terms. 
Russia has the lowest cost of delivery for substantial volumes of pipeline gas into 
Europe (Stern, 2017: 10). Besides Russian gas, global LNG constitutes the only 
significant source of potential extra supply. However, the affordability dimension of 
security of supply contributes to the increasing share of Russian gas in the European 
energy mix, with the possible exceptions of Poland and Lithuania (Henderson and 
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Sharples, 2018: 26). The prospects for alternative pipeline imports are relatively poor 
due to problems with North African supplies and the limited prospects from the Caspian 
region. In contrast, European LNG imports are likely to grow substantially and the global 
oversupply of LNG could last until at least 2020 and potentially up to 2025 (Stern, 2017: 
10–12). According to Henderson and Sharples (2018: 26), the long-anticipated surge in 
new LNG is likely to arrive by 2019, as US and Australian projects come online and ramp 
up, and the oversupply could last from 2019 into the early 2020s. Deák (2017) argues 
that the emergence of LNG underpins Europe’s relaxed approach to the issue of gas 
markets due to the huge regasification capacity in Europe (although unevenly 
distributed among the various countries). LNG is an instrument that could be used to 
reshape the EU gas markets because (1) it is a constraint for Gazprom’s leverage on 
European prices, and (2) it provides a flexible and only moderately more expensive 
alternative (Deák, 2017). 
In contrast to West European EU member states, Central and East European countries 
do not enjoy a sufficient degree of gas supply diversification, and thus have high 
vulnerability and low resilience, but it should be noted that the conditions and 
opportunities differ significantly across the various CEE countries. The EU has finally 
recognised that these deficiencies should be addressed as a matter of priority not only at 
a national but also at the EU level, irrespective of whether one subscribes to a 
commercial or geopolitical point of view (Yafimava, 2015: 6). Therefore, recently, the EU 
has actively supported infrastructure development to cope with supply disruption 
events, though perhaps many of these projects are not commercially viable (Stern, 2017: 
12).  
 
3.2.2. Diversifying Polish gas supplies 
Poland is the seventh biggest gas consumer in the EU, with 16.0 bcm consumed in 
2016. Gas production amounted to 4.2 bcm, while imports reached 13.9 bcm. Gas 
exports from Poland increased to 839.3 million cubic metres (mmcm) in 2016 (Table 11) 
(Ministry of Energy, 2017c: 29). 
Table 11. Poland’s gas balance, 2004–2016 (TJ) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Primary production 164 428 162 630 162 463 163 147 154 487 153 980 154 617 
Imports 341 520 358 692 374 162 346 884 383 350 341 507 373 125 
- 40 - 
Csaba Weiner / Security of energy supply and gas diversification in Poland 
 
Exports 1 578 1 500 1 570 1 509 1 323 1 399 1 577 
Stock changes -6 955 -7 588 -8 291 14 602 -10 406 10 939 9 943 
Gross inland consumption 497 538 512 337 526 870 523 228 526 204 505 129 536 211 
(continued on next page) 
Table (continued) 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Primary production 161 186 163 570 160 067 156 014 154 196 148 745 
Imports 404 586 420 496 429 951 406 506 418 358 510 167 
Exports 989 107 3 224 2 592 1 901 29 965 
Stock changes -27 348 -11 192 -11 702 1 289 6 111 -16 276 
Gross inland consumption 537 527 572 834 575 158 561 256 576 769 612 671 
Source: Eurostat (2018f). 
 
Although gas still has a small share in Poland’s electricity and energy mixes, forecasts 
show this will increase. The Energy Policy until 2030 assumes that gas consumption will 
grow by 40 per cent from 14.5 bcm in 2006 to 20.2 bcm in 2030 (Table A3 in the 
Appendix). In contrast, the 2013 forecasts of the Polish National Energy Conservation 
Agency, presented as part of the draft Energy Policy until 2050, show a smaller increase 
for the period up to 2050 (Table A7 in the Appendix). Honoré (2018b) highlights that the 
role of renewables has increased much faster than that of gas in recent years. Honoré 
believes that it is unlikely that natural gas will profit in the 2020s. Regarding 
sustainability, the replacement of coal power plants with gas reduces carbon dioxide 
emissions, but leakages cause methane emissions that are typically not taken into 
account (Brook et al., 2014; Horn, 2017). 
However, in Poland, there is room for reducing gas demand either through increasing 
efficiency or without increasing efficiency (energy conservation). Yet the significance of 
these ways of introducing domestic diversification tends to be underestimated. Despite 
attempting to achieve the same outcome, energy efficiency and energy conservation are 
two different things. Energy efficiency refers to using technologies that require less 
energy to perform the same function (e.g. using LED light bulbs, home insulation). In 
contrast, energy conservation means changing behaviours in order to use less energy 
(e.g. turning the lights off when leaving the room) (EIA, 2018). 
So far, four National Energy Efficiency Action Plans have been prepared in Poland 
(2007, 2011, 2014 and 2017). The fourth one was adopted in early 2018 (Ministry of 
Economy, 2014a; Ministry of Energy, 2018). The 2017 National Energy Efficiency Action 
Plan claims that according to the forecasts of the Polish Ministry of Energy – which are, 
in fact, the 2013 forecasts of the Polish National Energy Conservation Agency included in 
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the draft Energy Policy until 2050 and presented in Table A7 in the Appendix – the Polish 
primary energy demand will remain stable at around 102-103 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (mtoe) per year until 2020, and then it is expected to decrease by about 15 
per cent by 2050 (Ministry of Energy, 2017a). At the same time, Poland’s indicative 
national energy efficiency target for its primary energy demand in 2020, pursuant to the 
2012 Energy Efficiency Directive aimed at helping the EU reach its 20 per cent energy 
efficiency target by 2020, amounts to 96.4 mtoe. This would require achieving economic 
development without increasing primary energy consumption (or with decreasing 
primary energy demand). In contrast, final energy consumption is well below 70 mtoe, 
while the national indicative target for 2020 is 71.6 mtoe, which leaves room for 
increases until 2020 (Table A8 in the Appendix) (IEA, 2017a: 24). 
Between 2005 and 2015, an increase was witnessed in the share of transport (from 
22 per cent to 28 per cent) and services (from 12 per cent to 13 per cent) in final energy 
consumption, and a drop in the share of industry (from 26 per cent to 24 per cent), 
households (35 per cent to 31 per cent) and agriculture (from 8 per cent to 5 per cent). 
Households remained the largest consumer despite a drop in its share (Ministry of 
Energy, 2017a: 6). 
In 2015, Poland’s energy intensity was 16 per cent higher than Germany’s and the IEA 
European average,29 but 6 per cent lower than that of the Slovak Republic and 23 per 
cent lower than that of the Czech Republic (IEA, 2017a: 24). The Energy Policy until 
2030 predicted a significant reduction in primary energy consumption per unit of GDP 
from around 89.4 tonne of oil equivalent (toe)/PLN million at 2007 prices in 2006 to 
approximately 33.0 toe/PLN million at 2007 prices in 2030. Consumption of electricity 
per GDP was expected to decline from 137.7 MWh/PLN million at 2007 prices in 2006 to 
60.6 MWh/PLN million at 2007 prices in 2030. To put these numbers into context, the 
Energy Policy until 2030 declares that the energy efficiency of the Polish economy will 
only reach the 2005 EU15 average at the very end of the forecasted period (Table 12) 
(Ministry of Economy, 2009b: 17). Forecasts prepared by the Polish National Energy 
Conservation Agency and presented as part of the Polish Energy Policy until 2050 
indicate that the energy intensity of the Polish economy will decrease by about two-
thirds over the period 2010–2050 (Table 13). 
                                                 
29 IEA Europe refers to the European member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
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Table 12. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Policy until 2030 for energy and electricity intensity in Poland, 
2006–2030 
 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Energy intensity (toe/PLN million at 2007 prices) 89.4 73.1 56.7 46.6 38.6 33.0 
Electricity intensity (MWh/PLN million at 2007 prices) 137.7 110.4 90.4 77.8 67.8 60.6 
* Energy and electricity consumption per GDP, respectively. 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2009b: 18). 
 
Table 13. Forecasts of the Polish National Energy Conservation Agency (2013) for energy and electricity 
intensity in Poland, 2010–2050 
 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Energy intensity of the economy 
– primary energy 
(toe/PLN million at 2010 prices) 
72 62 52 45 39 33 29 26 24 
Energy intensity of the economy 
– final energy 
(toe/PLN million at 2010 prices) 
47 41 36 32 28 24 20 18 17 
Electricity intensity of the economy 
(MWh/PLN million at 2010 prices**) 
111 97 90 82 79 74 69 64 60 
* Energy and electricity consumption per GDP, respectively. 
** Originally, GWh/PLN million is given as the unit of measurement, but our calculations and the figures in 
Table 13 suggest that the appropriate unit of measurement is MWh/PLN million 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2015c: 9). 
 
In order to implement the 2012 EU Energy Efficiency Directive, Poland decided to 
adopt a 1.5 per cent annual saving of energy by energy distributors or retail energy sales 
companies from 2014 to 2020 (i.e. a total of 10.5 per cent) (Ministry of Economy, 2014a). 
In May 2016, the Polish Parliament adopted a new Energy Efficiency Act, which replaced 
the 2011 Energy Efficiency Act. As of 2013, the 2011 Energy Efficiency Act introduced a 
system of energy efficiency certificates, so-called White Certificates, imposed on 
companies selling electricity, natural gas or heat to end-users in Poland. This scheme is 
the key energy efficiency support mechanism in Poland (Ministry of Energy, 2017a). 
However, there are many other ways of improving energy efficiency. Wierzbowski et al. 
(2017: 60) mention the anticipated efficiency increase due to new highly efficient power 
generating units replacing older assets. It is also possible to reduce electricity grid 
losses, as current grid losses are above the EU average. In addition, improvements can 
be made to heat production and distribution. Combined heat and power (CHP) 
generation should gradually replace heating boiler technology. District heating 
modernization or replacement and the better insulation of homes would also contribute 
to energy efficiency through the limitation of heat losses. Regarding this last aspect, up 
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to 70 per cent of stand-alone houses in Poland (around 3.6 million) are insufficiently 
insulated (Ministry of Energy, 2017a). Finally, the popularity of low-energy buildings and 
household appliances should also be increased (Wierzbowski et al., 2017: 60). 
The diversification scheme (Figure 1) indicates that a further option lies in sectoral 
diversification, either domestic or external. Similarly to the category of “reducing gas 
demand” (either through energy efficiency or energy conservation), sectoral 
diversification also aims at reducing gas demand but in a different way. Nonetheless, 
because of the low share of natural gas in the energy/electricity mix, sectoral 
diversification has little relevance in the case of Poland. However, increasing electricity 
imports would be an option as a form of external sectoral diversification. 
In the early 2010s, many believed that increasing domestic gas production, another 
means of domestic diversification, would be a real opportunity for Poland. In Central 
and Eastern Europe, only Romania has a substantial gas production, but it is also not 
negligible in Poland. Gas production is relatively stable, amounting to around 4 billion 
cubic metres per annum (bcma). It accounts for around a quarter of the Polish balance of 
gas supply (domestic production + imports), if gas exports and changes in gas 
inventories (gas storages) are not taken into account (Ministry of Energy, 2017c: 29). 
Shale gas was regarded as a genuine prospect in Poland, but the hype of the early 
2010s has proved to be an illusion. At that time, the government expected to start 
commercial production of shale gas in late 2014 or early 2015. In its Golden Rules Case 
or best-case scenario, the IEA (2012) predicted unconventional gas production in the EU 
would be led by Poland, starting in the mid-2010s. Poland wanted the state-controlled 
PGNiG company to double its gas production with both conventional and 
unconventional gas by 2019 (Reuters, 2012). In September 2011, Polish Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk believed Poland would basically be able to switch to using its own gas 
sources by 2035 (Vzglyad, 2011). However, so far all efforts have failed. Everything 
started with lower resource assessments than expected (Figure 3). This was followed by 
low exploratory activity. By June 2017, concession holders had drilled only 72 
exploratory wells (PSG, 2017c). Foreign companies have faced difficult geological and 
regulatory challenges in Poland, leading them to pull out of the market. Also, lower oil 
prices have discouraged investment in unconventional gas reserves. Furthermore, in 
2010, Gény suggested that Polish projects would not be cost competitive with imports 
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over the following decade. However, there is hope in Poland that in the long-term 
perspective unconventional gas could play a crucial role (Wierzbowski et al., 2017: 60). 
With shale gas, Poland aimed to eliminate dependence on Gazprom. Climate incentives 
(i.e. the need to replace coal) were not considered. 
 
Figure 3. Shale gas resource assessments in Poland by different institutions 
EIA 
(April 2011) 
> 
EIA 
(June 2013) 
> 
Polish Geological Institute 
(PSG, March 2012) 
> 
USGS 
(Gautier et al., July 2012) 
Source: Weiner (2016: 25). 
 
Poland is still highly dependent on Russian gas supplies. In 2016, 74.3 per cent (10.3 
bcm) of the total gas imports (13.9 bcm) came from Russia. Supplies from Germany and 
the Czech Republic represented 18.2 per cent (2.5 bcm) and 0.04 per cent (4.9 mmcm), 
respectively. Due to the start of commercial LNG deliveries in 2016, the share of gas 
from Qatar and Norway was 6.9 per cent (963.6 mmcm) and 0.6 per cent (78.4 mmcm), 
accordingly (Ministry of Energy, 2017c: 29). 
Poland was the first country to receive Soviet gas in the mid-1940s. After the change 
of regime, in the 1990s, Russian gas supplies were initially arranged according to the 
Yamburg and Orenburg agreements. These were replaced by the 1996 Yamal contract 
up to 2020 to supply Russian gas, which was related to the 1993 intergovernmental 
agreement and 1995 protocol to build the Polish section of the Yamal-Europe transit gas 
pipeline running from Russia to Germany across Belarus and Poland. The Yamal-Europe 
pipeline was commissioned in 1999 (see below). However, due to formerly 
overestimated gas demand in Poland, the Yamal contract was modified in 2003. It was 
extended until 2022, while annual import volumes were reduced. In contrast, Poland 
significantly increased its gas imports from Russia in 2009, after the early 2009 removal 
of the controversial Russian–Ukrainian intermediary company Rosukrenergo (also, see 
below). That year, Poland was the only country to increase its imports from Gazprom 
Export, Gazprom’s export arm, and at that significantly so.30 In 2010, Poland was 
Gazprom Export’s fourth largest customer outside the former Soviet Union, ahead of 
France. While other countries worried about the excess gas volumes contracted, Poland 
was trying to adjust its negative gas balance in 2009–2010. After a short-term contract 
                                                 
30 Switzerland took roughly the same amount as in 2008 (Weiner, 2013). 
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in 2009, it was only in October 2010 that an annex to the Yamal contract was signed, 
allowing for an increase in gas purchases. With this step, Gazprom’s role in Poland’s gas 
supplies increased. However, the contract was never actually renewed or extended until 
2037. 
High gas prices compared to other Gazprom buyers have been the subject of 
continuous disputes. In 2011, Poland’s PGNiG turned to arbitration, while in 2012, 
PGNiG secured a deal with Gazprom. Again, in 2015, PGNiG filed a lawsuit against 
Gazprom over gas prices. Poland was one of the Central and East European EU member 
states in which the European Commission investigated Gazprom’s anti-competitive 
practices. It is broadly known that following inspections at the premises of concerned 
gas companies in these selected states in 2011, DG COMP opened formal proceedings 
against Gazprom in 2012 and, finally, issued a Statement of Objections in 2015. All of DG 
COMP’s three main findings (preliminary view) referred to Poland. Firstly, DG COMP 
found that Gazprom imposed territorial restrictions (export bans, destination clauses 
and other measures) preventing gas exports. Secondly, these restrictions could have 
resulted in higher gas prices and allowed Gazprom to pursue an unfair pricing policy. 
Thirdly, Gazprom might have been leveraging its dominant market position by making 
gas supplies conditional on obtaining unrelated commitments concerning gas transport 
infrastructure. In Poland, gas supplies were made dependent on the acceptance of 
Gazprom reinforcing its control over the Yamal-Europe pipeline (Stern and Yafimava, 
2017: 2–3). In February 2017, Gazprom proposed commitments to address the 
European Commission’s competition concerns, and in March 2017, the European 
Commission invited comments from all interested parties on these proposals. Finally, in 
May 2018, the European Commission adopted a decision imposing a set of binding 
obligations on Gazprom (European Commission, 2018a). Firstly, Gazprom must remove 
restrictions on customers to re-sell gas cross-border. Secondly, Gazprom has to facilitate 
gas flows to and from isolated markets by swaps, flexibility, as well as fixed and 
transparent service fees. Thirdly, Gazprom has to ensure competitive gas prices, 
reflecting competitive West European price benchmarks. Fourthly, regarding the Yamal-
Europe pipeline, the European Commission found that the situation could not be 
changed through such an antitrust procedure, as gas relations between Russia and 
Poland are determined by intergovernmental agreements. A May 2015 decision by the 
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Polish Energy Regulatory Office did not confirm allegations that Gazprom would have 
foreclosed the Polish gas market with regard to the Yamal-Europe pipeline, since its 
owner, Europolgaz, co-owned by Gazprom, was unable to delay or block investment on 
the pipeline (investment enabling reverse flows from Germany was also implemented) 
(European Commission, 2018b). 
PGNiG has decided not to extend the Yamal contract with Gazprom when it expires in 
2022. Poland is to replace Russian gas mainly with that of Norway via a yet-to-be built 
pipeline and with LNG via the new LNG terminal. 
Geographical gas import source diversification implies both contractual relations for 
sale and purchase and the construction of the appropriate infrastructure. In Poland, a 
minimum level of diversification is required by legislation. In 2000, the maximum share 
of imported gas from one country of origin relative to the total volume of imported gas 
was set for each year until 2020: 88 per cent in 2001–2002, 78 per cent in 2003–2004, 
72 per cent in 2005–2009, 70 per cent in 2010–2014, 59 per cent in 2015–2018 and 49 
per cent in 2019–2020 (Regulation of the Council of Ministers, 2000). The Regulation 
applied to all wholesalers buying gas from abroad. However, these requirements raised 
doubts as to their compliance with EU law. In 2017, a new regulation was published to 
specify the maximum percentage share of gas imported from one country. Accordingly, 
it cannot exceed 70 per cent in 2017–2022 and 33 per cent in 2023–2026. The 
regulation contains a formula for calculating this share, and makes it possible for there 
to be exemptions from the obligation (e.g. for the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, see 
below). It is notable that intra-EU purchases and supplies originating from the states of 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Switzerland are not defined as imports 
(Kancelaria.LEX.pl, 2017). Until recently, Poland has mostly just talked about 
diversifying away from Russian gas supplies. Instead of costly investments in 
infrastructure and contractual relations, Poland has tended to emphasize solidarity as a 
means of concealing its own responsibility, while – as Bartuška (2008: 57) has aptly 
formulated – there can be no supply security without a willingness to pay for it. 
Poland requires not only new cross-border infrastructure but also significant 
enhancement of its domestic pipeline network. Finally, in the 2010s, notable steps have 
been made to achieve diversification. Since 2016, Poland has been able to import non-
Russian gas not only by pipeline but also as LNG. Via pipeline, Poland can buy gas from 
- 47 - 
Csaba Weiner / Security of energy supply and gas diversification in Poland 
 
the east, west and south, but capacities are very limited at the southern and western 
borders. Some of the cross-border pipelines aim only to meet local needs and gas is not 
introduced into the transmission grid. Poland can physically receive gas through the 
following channels: 
(1) from the east through Belarus (through two entry points from the Gazprom 
Transgaz Belarus network and two exit points from the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline) 
and from/through Ukraine (through two entry points); 
(2) from the west from/through Germany (through four entry points); and 
(3) from the south from/through the Czech Republic (through three entry points) 
(Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Cross-border pipeline gas and LNG import capacity into Poland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Effective April 2016, the existing cross-border connections at Lasów, Gubin and Kamminke were 
replaced with a single point called GCP Gaz-System/Ontras (its capacity is 1.6 bcma). 
2) The Yamal-Europe gas pipeline cross-border entry point. 
3) The Yamal-Europe gas pipeline cross-border exit point and virtual entry point. 
4) Yamal-Europe gas pipeline exit points (located) in Poland.  
Note: According to my collected data, all the border crossings are indicated on the map (including 
pipelines of local significance; either for transmission or distribution). In parentheses, 2017 import 
capacity is indicated in bcma where data are available (URE, 2018: 147–148). 
Source: Own compilation. 
Blank map: http://www.youreuropemap.com/. 
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Until the January 2009 Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis, only one interconnection worth 
mentioning had been built to receive gas from the non-east direction. This German–
Polish interconnection with an entry point at Lasów has been used to import gas from 
Germany and Norway. Recently, Poland’s import possibilities from the non-east 
directions have been increased due to (1) a new interconnector with the Czech Republic 
(called STORK); (2) virtual reverse flow services on the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline; (3) 
capacity expansion at Lasów, and (4) the first LNG terminal in Świnoujście. Without 
taking into account the virtual reverse flow service, more than 6 bcma of capacity has 
been added. These three (No. 1, 3 and 4) provide a total of 7 bcma of cross-border entry 
capacity into Poland (Table 14), compared to the 16 bcma for consumption.  
 
Table 14. New cross-border pipeline gas and LNG import capacity in Poland since the January 2009 
Russian–Ukrainian gas crisis 
 Capacity (bcma) Year of putting 
into operational 
Pipeline gas 
Czech–Polish interconnection (STORK) 0.5 2011 
Virtual reverse flow service on the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline 6.0 2011–2016 
Capacity expansion of the German–Polish interconnection at Lasów 1.5 (from 0.9) 2012 
LNG 
LNG terminal in Świnoujście 5 (3.7 mtpa) 2016* 
Mtpa – million tonnes per annum. 1 mt of LNG = 1.36 bcm of natural gas. 
* Commercial operation. 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
Further pipeline plans or projects include the Baltic Pipe, an interconnection between 
Denmark and Poland for transporting Norwegian gas; new Poland–Ukraine and Poland–
Czech (STORK II) interconnections; and the first Poland–Slovakia and Poland–Lithuania 
(GIPL) interconnections. The main geographical source diversification project aiming to 
end Russian gas imports by 2022 is the Northern Gate project that includes the Baltic 
Pipe and the LNG terminal. While the LNG plan has finally been realised, the Baltic Pipe 
is still a long-running plan going back to 2001 without a final investment decision 
despite strong Polish commitments. In addition to diversifying away from Russian gas, 
there are two other main reasons for this project. Firstly, it is related to Poland’s 
presence on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. Secondly, the pipeline might serve 
regional cooperation, as Poland may perhaps become a gateway for gas supplies to the 
south and east (Gawlikowska-Fyk and Godzimirski, 2017: 5). Future LNG plans/projects 
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include not only the extension of the regasification capacity of the existing plant from 5 
bcma to 7.5 bcma and the construction of a second quay (enabling trans-shipment, 
bunkering and developing inland waterway navigation), but also a Floating Storage and 
Regasification Unit (FSRU) in the Gdansk Bay (Table 15). Only with the launch of the 
Baltic Pipe (planned to have a 10 bcma capacity), Poland would be able to import 17 
bcma of non-Russian gas. This would be supplemented by (some of) the above-
mentioned projects. However, so far, none of the projects have entered construction 
phase. As of end-May 2018, among these seven plans/projects, two, the Poland–Slovakia 
and the Poland–Lithuania interconnections have final investment decisions (Kuś, 
2018).31 
 
Table 15. Plans/projects to increase cross-border pipeline gas and LNG import capacity in Poland  
 Entry  
capacity 
(bcma) 
Exit  
capacity 
(bcma) 
Status Year of  
expected 
commis- 
sioning 
Pipeline gas 
Poland–Ukraine interconnection 5 5 Market screening ongoing 
until 8 June 2018 
2022 
Polish–Czech interconnection II (STORK II) 6.5 5 Pre-investment phase … 
Poland–Slovakia interconnection 5.7 4.7 CA signed in Apr. 2018 (FID) 2021 
Poland–Lithuania interconnection (GIPL) 1.7 2.4 CA signed in May 2018 (FID) 2021 
Baltic Pipe (Denmark–Poland 
interconnection) 
10 3 Design phase 2022 
LNG 
Extension of the regasification capacity 
of LNG terminal in Świnoujście 
7.5 
(5.6 mtpa) 
 Preparatory works finalised 2022 
FSRU LNG in the Gdansk Bay 4.1–8.1   2021 
CA – connection agreement. FID – final investment decision. 
Source: Own compilation based on Bielecki (2017), Gaz-System (2017, 2018, n.d.), Gaz-System and 
Energinet (2017), Kus (2018), Reuters (2018a). 
 
The 10 bcma of capacity of the Baltic Pipe and a similar contract with Norway would 
mean excess capacity and surplus supplies to Poland, which Poland intends to transmit 
to neighbouring countries, such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic and possibly Ukraine 
(Radio Poland, 2018a, 2018b). 
Regarding non-Russian gas supplies, Poland has been supplied by Germany and the 
Czech Republic since the 1990s, taking only a very small amount of gas for their own 
                                                 
31 Concerning non-Russian imports, people tend to talk only about import capacity, while a domestic 
pipeline network also needs to be prepared for non-eastern imports. 
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local needs. The 1990s saw a stream of diversification announcements about bringing 
pipeline gas from Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. But despite negotiations and even 
at times signed contracts, only a small contract was concluded with Norway on the 
supply of a mere 0.5 bcma of gas for the period between 2000 and 2006 (Stern, 2005: 
116; Statoil.ru, 1999). Russian gas was cheaper than Norwegian (ICIS Heren, 2006). In 
the early 2000s, Poland was unable to go ahead with a large Norwegian contract due to 
problems with accommodating large amounts of gas. The Norwegians wanted to export 
9-10 bcma of gas to ensure that the pipeline was profitable, while Poland intended to 
import only 5 bcma (Warsaw Business Journal, 2001). Poland did not succeed in finding 
other buyers for the remaining quantities (ICIS Heren, 2006).32 
A certain type of diversification was achieved from the east by introducing gas 
imports from Ukraine’s Naftohaz and from Central Asia through intermediary 
companies. Naftohaz was selling a very small quantity of gas to satisfy local needs under 
a long-term gas supply contract, signed in 2004 for the period until 2020, but Ukraine 
permanently suspended deliveries in 2010. Intermediary companies first included Eural 
Trans Gas, which was registered and operated in Hungary as an offshore business entity, 
and then the Swiss-based Russian–Ukrainian Rosukrenergo, which functioned until end-
2008. Contrary to the listed intermediaries, Gazprom’s Gazprom Schweiz, which re-
exports Central Asian gas to Central and Eastern Europe, is not present in Poland. 
As noted, Poland began receiving commercial LNG deliveries in June 2016. Poland has 
one long-term and one mid-term LNG supply contract and it also buys gas on the spot 
market. A long-term contract with Qatar’s Qatargas was signed in 2009 for the supply of 
1 mtpa of LNG for 20 years to be delivered as of 2014. The contract was amended in 
2014 and 2015 to divert LNG supplies destined for Poland to other clients in 2015 and 
the first half of 2016 because of delays in the LNG facility’s operation start-up time. 
However, in 2017, an agreement was reached to double volumes to 2 mtpa. A mid-term 
LNG supply contract was signed with the UK-based Centrica to receive nine LNG 
shipments which were to be sourced from the US Sabine Pass LNG Terminal between 
2018 and 2022. In addition, in June 2018, two long-term agreements (but still not final 
contracts) were signed, each for the purchase of 2 mtpa of LNG from the US over 20 
                                                 
32 Import diversification is reflected as German (since 1993) and Czech imports (since 2012) in the IEA 
and Eurostat statistics. 
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years.33 Yet, as emphasized, availability is only one dimension of security of supply. 
There are serious questions about the price or affordability dimension of LNG supplies. 
“PGNiG agreed a contract with Qatar for one of the highest prices seen in any gas 
contract anywhere in the world” (Jonathan Stern, email communication, 14 January 
2013). A 2009 source stated that LNG supplies from Qatar might be 30-50 per cent more 
expensive than Russian gas (GOwarsaw.eu, 2009), while another source from 2013, with 
precise numbers, suggested more than 50 per cent higher prices (Reuters, 2013). 
However, low(er) oil prices experienced since the mid-2010s have contributed to a 
decrease in Qatari LNG prices. In 2015, a Polish expert even went as far as saying that 
Qatari LNG could be competitive when comparing with Russian gas import prices 
(Denková, 2015). 
The final type of diversification is transit or route diversification. Poland would have 
had the possibility of diversifying its transit options through the Nord Stream gas 
pipeline but it did not ask for that opportunity. The German government invited Poland 
to the Nord Stream project, but Warsaw refused. Wingas – then a Russian–German joint 
venture, now a wholly owned subsidiary of Gazprom – also offered to link the Polish gas 
grid to the OPAL gas pipeline, a European onshore connecting pipeline of Nord Stream, 
but Poland did not accept (Cameron, 2007: 3). Poland has shown strong opposition to 
Nord Stream. Instead of building this pipeline, Poland unsuccessfully campaigned in 
favour of either Yamal-Europe 2 or Amber. Yamal-Europe 2 would not have been a 
parallel pipeline to Yamal-Europe 1, but would have run from the Belarusian border via 
Poland to Slovakia, while Amber was a proposed pipeline crossing EU countries, from 
Russia through Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to Germany.34 However, Russia’s goal was 
to circumvent (unreliable) transit states (only secondary consideration was given to the 
creation of additional capacity). Above all, Poland attacked Nord Stream on the grounds 
of its environmental consequences (a potential ecological disaster) (BruxInfo, 2008). 
Former Polish Defence Minister Radek Sikorski and others complained that Germany 
                                                 
33 One is with the US Port Arthur LNG scheduled to start flowing in 2023 from an LNG facility being 
developed in Jefferson County, Texas, and the other – with the US Venture Global LNG to be supplied from 
LNG facilities which will be located in the Gulf of Mexico in Louisiana, and which are expected to be 
completed in 2022 and 2023, respectively (PGNiG, 2018a, 2018b; Reuters, 2018d). 
34 Previously, another plan was called Amber, a joint plan involving Poland’s PGNiG, Denmark’s DONG 
(now Ørsted) and Lithuania’s Lietuvos Dujos (later merged into Lithuania’s Energijos Skirstymo 
Operatorius), which would have delivered gas to Lithuania through Poland. However, other plans also 
exist that have been referred to as Amber. 
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had not consulted with Poland before the decision was made on the pipeline, and 
considered the project to be President Putin’s most outrageous attempt to divide the EU 
leading to economic and geopolitical disaster. They regarded Nord Stream as 
economically absurd, referring to the costs of constructing and financing the pipeline, 
future tariffs and Gazprom’s growing dominance (Cameron, 2007: 2). They feared that 
with the construction of Nord Stream, Gazprom would turn off the gas tap to Poland 
without violating West European (German) interests. Fears were also expressed not 
only because of Poland losing its bargaining power and becoming more vulnerable to 
blackmailing, but also due to a potential transit revenue drop.35 While Gazprom’s 
growing dominance could be a problem, and Nord Stream 2 could bring further negative 
consequences, the above accusations have so far not been confirmed. 
Gas transit via Ukraine will continue to be necessary in sizeable volumes until Nord 
Stream 2 and Turkish Stream are launched. However, thanks to Nord Stream 2 and its 
European onshore connecting pipeline EUGAL, gas transit via the Ukrainian–Slovakian 
cross-border point is expected to fall considerably, while gas transit via Poland through 
the Yamal-Europe pipeline is likely to continue. On the other hand, the launch of Turkish 
steam’s first line will result in a substantial decline in gas transit via the Ukrainian–
Romanian cross-border point due to the diversion of gas destined for Turkey and the 
Black Sea away from Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria. Nonetheless, even though Ukraine 
will perform a smaller role, it will not be completely eliminated and it will remain an 
important player. The major issue is the commercial viability of maintaining a large gas 
transmission system with multiple exit points for the delivery of relatively small annual 
volumes (Sharples, 2018). Currently, the majority of the spare capacity comes via 
Ukraine, and, as Henderson and Sharples (2018: 26) argue, the EU wants to protect the 
Ukrainian transit route not only for commercial but also for political reasons. 
 
                                                 
35 In January 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov tried to assure Poland that Russia would not 
reduce transit through Poland (Rosukrenergo, 2008). 
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4. Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper started with the question of whether the three-dimensional approach is 
appropriate for addressing Polish supply security due to Poland’s securitized energy 
landscape. We find that it can do so without requiring modifications. We also find that 
besides the energy perspective, the institutional context given by the EU and the 
geopolitical factor play very important roles among our so-called influencing factors. 
Due to the geopolitical factor, Poland has fears of (1) problems with the availability and 
affordability of Russian gas supplies and (2) foreign (German) technological reliance 
regarding renewables production, while (3) Russia could not be assigned a role in the 
case of nuclear energy. However, the overemphasised role of the geopolitical factor may 
lead to suboptimal energy policy decisions. In the past, energy market factors proved to 
be stronger, primarily due to prioritizing the affordability dimension, but recently, signs 
of a shift have started to appear.  
Poland’s power sector consists of a fleet of very old facilities with a structure that is 
not suitable for the twenty-first century in terms of sustainability. There is great 
uncertainty about Poland’s energy policy and security of supply because of 
infrastructure deficiencies and the unknown future role of the particular fuels in the 
energy/electricity mix. One thing is sure that everything revolves around coal. It seems 
as if every possible energy policy step is taken to maintain the role of coal for as long as 
possible. It is as if Poland moves toward sustainability only as much and as soon as it is 
required by its EU membership (the role of the institutional influencing factor). 
Although it would be easy to suggest that the coal industry captures Poland’s energy 
policy, the fact is that the geopolitical considerations also cement reliance on coal (in 
agreement with Heinrich et al., 2016: 1–2; Schwartzkopff and Schulz, 2017: 9–10), 
providing low energy import dependence. Nevertheless, the role of coal will surely 
decrease. The question is to what extent and which energy/fuels will substitute it. 
Forecasts used for the draft Polish Energy Policy until 2050 indicate that the expected 
role of hard coal by 2050 stands in complete opposition to environmental sustainability 
and EU objectives, whereas the role of lignite seems to decrease dramatically as of the 
2030s. 
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Although in a 2050 perspective, nuclear energy is to take over the biggest part of this 
niche, no ultimate decision has been made to implement a nuclear project in Poland. For 
a country in which no nuclear power plants have ever operated and experience and 
knowledge are quite limited, no quick decision should be expected, especially at a time 
when European energy sector trends are against nuclear energy. In this respect, 
affordability considerations, as well as the issue of conformity and compliance with EU 
rules should be addressed. However, currently, even the most basic questions related to 
nuclear energy remain open and completely unanswered. 
After nuclear energy, renewables are expected to be the second to substitute coal in 
the Polish energy balance, whereas Poland is sceptical about renewables, and so far 
renewables have not affected the role of conventional fuels. Legislative uncertainty also 
holds back renewable energy development. The 2016 legislation has blocked onshore 
wind projects, which are both a highly political topic and the main driver of total 
renewable production. This caused a serious setback to Poland achieving the EU 
renewables target. However, the 2018 amendments to the relevant Acts may encourage 
both onshore and offshore investors. Offshore wind may enter the Polish electricity mix 
soon and will perhaps be a driver, backed by the domestic industry. Solar power is a late 
arrival on the Polish power landscape that might show significant growth in coming 
years, from which domestic PV modules production could also profit. Biomass, a 
contradictory renewable energy source, continues to expand, and provides an easy way 
to increase the role of renewables, while hydropower is not expected to significantly 
grow. 
Finally, natural gas could also witness a relatively substantial increase in Poland. 
However, the issue of gas is very sensitive in Poland, despite the small share of gas in the 
energy/electricity/heat mix. This sensitivity is derived from Russia’s dominant role in 
gas imports, the still insufficient level of geographical diversification, and perceptions of 
Russia as a security risk. As proved, perceptions are very important when evaluating 
dependence. These geopolitical considerations have a crucial (but not necessarily 
decisive) role in determining the Polish energy policy. Since the January 2009 Russian–
Ukrainian gas crisis, Poland has taken action to diversify its gas supplies, and after many 
years of only speaking about diversification and solidarity, it has finally achieved results. 
Geopolitical aspects would lead Poland towards not prolonging its long-term gas supply 
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contract with Russia. This decision comes in spite of the facts that (1) Russian gas is and 
will remain very important to Europe, (2) the role of gas is expected to increase in 
Poland, and (3) the institutional context given by the EU (the Third Energy Package, the 
antitrust procedure, and other measures now related to the Energy Union) increase 
security of supply through both the availability and affordability dimensions. The 
question is whether the termination of Russian gas supplies will actually happen, and 
whether this would really serve security of supply, as diversification alone does not 
inevitably lead to achieving this goal. The answer to the first question primarily depends 
on the Baltic Pipe project and the supply contract to import Norwegian gas. Despite 
Poland’s confidence and determination, there is no certainty that the project and the 
supply contract will go ahead as planned. Poland will suffer loss of face if the Law and 
Justice government should finally arrive at a deal with Russia. Should the Baltic Pipe 
project and Norwegian gas imports fail, it is questionable whether Poland will still want 
to and be able to build a portfolio of non-Russian pipeline gas and LNG purchases 
without a Russian contract. However, the end of Russian long-term contract gas does not 
mean the definite end of Russian gas purchases. Answering the second question also 
requires the actual prioritisation of different dimensions of security of supply, taking 
into account various influencing factors (e.g. potential higher gas prices backed by a 
solid availability dimension versus the suspected high risk related to the availability and 
affordability of Russian gas supplies). This points to a complexity of preferences and 
choices, as well as to the constant uncertainty surrounding outcomes, which the long-
awaited new Polish energy policy should also address. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Policy until 2030 for final energy demand in Poland, by energy 
carriers, 2006–2030 (mtoe) 
 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Coal 12.3 10.9 10.1 10.3 10.4 10.5 
Oil products 21.9 22.4 23.1 24.3 26.3 27.9 
Natural gas 10.0 9.5 10.3 11.1 12.2 12.9 
Renewables 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.9 6.2 6.7 
Electricity 9.5 9.0 9.9 11.2 13.1 14.8 
Network heat 7.0 7.4 8.2 9.1 10.0 10.5 
Other fuels 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 
Total 65.5 64.4 67.3 72.7 79.3 84.4 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2009b: 12). 
 
 
Table A2. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Policy until 2030 for gross final energy demand from renewables 
in Poland, by types of energy, 2006–2030 (ktoe) 
 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Electricity 370.6 715.0 1 516.1 2 686.6 3 256.3 3 396.3 
   Solid biomass 159.2 298.5 503.2 892.3 953.0 994.9 
   Biogas 13.8 31.4 140.7 344.5 555.6 592.6 
   Wind 22.0 174.0 631.9 1 178.4 1 470.0 1 530.0 
   Hydro 175.6 211.0 240.3 271.4 276.7 276.7 
   Photovoltaics 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.1 2.1 
Heat 4 312.7 4 481.7 5 046.3 6 255.9 7 048.7 7 618.4 
   Solid biomass 4 249.8 4 315.1 4 595.7 5 405.9 5 870.8 6 333.2 
   Biogas 27.1 72.2 256.5 503.1 750.0 800.0 
   Geothermal 32.2 80.1 147.5 221.5 298.5 348.1 
   Solar 3.6 14.2 46.7 125.4 129.4 137.1 
Transport biofuels 96.9 549.0 884.1 1 444.1 1 632.6 1 881.9 
   Carbohydrate-starch bioethanol 61.1 150.7 247.6 425.2 443.0 490.1 
   Rapeseed biodiesel 35.8 398.3 636.5 696.8 645.9 643.5 
   Second generation bioethanol 0.0 0.0 0.0 210.0 240.0 250.0 
   Second generation biodiesel 0.0 0.0 0.0 112.1 213.0 250.0 
   Biohydrogen 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 90.8 248.3 
Total gross final energy from renewables 4 780 5 746 7 447 10 387 11 938 12 897 
Gross final energy 61 815 61 316 63 979 69 203 75 480 80 551 
% share of renewables 7.7 9.4 11.6 15.0 15.8 16.0 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2009b: 12). 
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Table A3. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Policy until 2030 for primary energy demand in Poland, by fuel, 
2006–2030 (mtoe and natural units) 
  2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Lignite* mtoe 12.6 11.22 12.16 9.39 11.21 9.72 
mt 59.4 52.8 57.2 44.2 52.7 45.7 
Hard coal** mtoe 43.8 37.9 35.3 34.6 34.0 36.7 
mt 76.5 66.1 61.7 60.4 59.3 64.0 
Oil and oil products mtoe 24.3 25.1 26.1 27.4 29.5 31.1 
mt 24.3 25.1 26.1 27.4 29.5 31.1 
Natural gas*** mtoe 12.3 12.0 13.0 14.5 16.1 17.2 
bcm 14.5 14.1 15.4 17.1 19.0 20.2 
Renewables mtoe 5.0 6.3 8.4 12.2 13.8 14.7 
Others mtoe 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.6 
Nuclear fuel mtoe 0.0 0 0 2.5 5.0 7.5 
Electricity exports mtoe -0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total primary energy mtoe 97.8 93.2 95.8 101.7 111.0 118.5 
* Calorific value of lignite: 8.9 MJ/kg. 
** Calorific value of hard coal: 24 MJ/kg. 
*** Calorific value of natural gas: 35.5 MJ/m3. 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2009b: 14). 
 
 
Table A4. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Policy until 2030 for electricity demand in Poland, 2006–2030 
(TWh) 
 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Final energy 111.0 104.6 115.2 130.8 152.7 171.6 
Energy sector 11.6 11.3 11.6 12.1 12.7 13.3 
Transmission and distribution losses 14.1 12.9 13.2 13.2 15.0 16.8 
Net demand 136.6 128.7 140.0 156.1 180.4 201.7 
Own use 14.1 12.3 12.8 13.2 14.2 15.7 
Gross demand 150.7 141.0 152.8 169.3 194.6 217.4 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2009b: 14). 
 
 
Table A5. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Policy until 2030 for net electricity production in Poland, by fuel, 
2006–2030 (TWh) 
 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Hard coal 86.1 68.2 62.9 62.7 58.4 71.8 
Lignite 49.9 44.7 51.1 40.0 48.4 42.3 
Natural gas 4.6 4.4 5.0 8.4 11.4 13.4 
Oil products 1.6 1.9 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.0 
Nuclear fuel 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.5 21.1 31.6 
Renewables 3.9 8.0 17.0 30.1 36.5 38.0 
Pumped hydro 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Waste 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Total 147.7 128.7 140.1 156.1 180.3 201.8 
Share of energy from renewables (%) 2.7 6.2 12.2 19.3 20.2 18.8 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2009b: 15). 
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Table A6. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Policy until 2030 for fuel consumption for power generation 
(including for co-generation) in Poland, 2006–2030 (ktoe) 
 2006 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Hard coal 25 084 20 665 18 897 17 722 16 327 18 331 
Lignite 12 517 11 091 12 036 9 266 11 095 9 615 
Natural gas 961 970 1 094 1 623 2 114 2 473 
Oil products 533 591 732 791 806 837 
Nuclear power 0 0 0 2 515 5 030 7 546 
Renewables 703 1 461 2 912 5 128 5 995 6 212 
   Hydro 174 209 239 270 275 275 
   Wind 22 174 632 1 178 1 470 1 530 
   Biomass 458 943 1 566 2 693 2 749 2 805 
   Biogas 48 135 475 986 1 500 1 600 
   Solar 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Waste 144 154 162 168 185 201 
Total fuel consumption 39 942 34 933 35 832 37 213 41 552 45 215 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2009b: 16). 
 
 
Table A7. Forecasts of the Polish National Energy Conservation Agency (2013) for primary energy demand 
in Poland, by fuel, 2010–2050 
 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Mtoe 
Hard coal 43.0 36.9 35.5 32.8 31.3 30.1 29.9 27.1 24.4 
Lignite 11.6 14.3 13.0 11.9 9.1 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.1 
Crude oil 26.5 25.4 27.2 27.5 26.9 25.1 23.4 22.3 21.5 
Natural gas 12.8 14.1 15.2 15.3 15.2 16.1 16.1 15.8 15.5 
Renewables 7.3 9.2 12.0 12.6 14.0 14.6 14.1 13.8 13.7 
Nuclear energy 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 5.6 10.8 10.9 10.6 10.3 
Others 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Total 101.8 100.2 103.2 103.3 102.5 99.5 97.3 92.2 87.9 
% 
Hard coal 42.2 36.8 34.4 31.8 30.5 30.3 30.7 29.4 27.8 
Lignite 11.4 14.3 12.6 11.5 8.9 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.4 
Crude oil 26.0 25.3 26.4 26.6 26.2 25.2 24.0 24.2 24.5 
Natural gas 12.6 14.1 14.7 14.8 14.8 16.2 16.5 17.1 17.6 
Renewables 7.2 9.2 11.6 12.2 13.7 14.7 14.5 15.0 15.6 
Nuclear energy 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 5.5 10.9 11.2 11.5 11.7 
Others 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2015c: 5). 
 
 
Table A8. Forecasts of the Polish National Energy Conservation Agency (2013) for final energy demand in 
Poland, by sectors, 2010–2050 (mtoe) 
 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Agriculture 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 
Industry and construction 15.4 15.2 16.8 17.8 18.9 20.0 20.9 21.0 20.2 
Transport 17.6 18.9 20.9 21.4 21.0 19.5 17.9 16.6 16.0 
Services 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.2 8.1 7.9 7.5 7.5 7.2 
Households 21.1 21.4 22.4 22.5 22.0 21.0 19.9 18.7 17.6 
Total 66.5 67.2 71.6 72.3 72.3 70.4 68.2 65.7 62.7 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2015c: 6). 
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Table A9. Forecasts of the Polish National Energy Conservation Agency (2013) for electricity production in 
Poland, by fuel, 2010–2050 
 
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
TWh 
Hard coal 87.9 72.5 76.9 75.9 79.0 84.4 88.8 82.3 74.5 
Lignite 48.6 58.4 53.8 49.6 38.1 11.1 11.3 10.7 10.3 
Natural gas 6.8 5.8 11.8 11.9 13.0 18.4 17.5 23.3 20.4 
Renewables 11.6 20.6 34.0 36.9 51.9 61.1 65.1 67.5 73.2 
Nuclear energy 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8 23.3 45.1 45.4 44.2 43.2 
Others 2.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Total 157.7 158.8 177.9 187.5 206.8 221.4 229.7 229.5 222.9 
% 
Hard coal 55.7 45.7 43.2 40.5 38.2 38.1 38.7 35.9 33.4 
Lignite 30.8 36.8 30.2 26.5 18.4 5.0 4.9 4.7 4.6 
Natural gas 4.3 3.7 6.6 6.3 6.3 8.3 7.6 10.2 9.2 
Renewables 7.4 13.0 19.1 19.7 25.1 27.6 28.3 29.4 32.8 
Nuclear energy 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 11.3 20.4 19.8 19.3 19.4 
Others 1.6 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2015c: 6). 
 
 
Table A10. Forecasts of the Polish National Energy Conservation Agency (2013) for net heat production in 
Poland, by fuel, 2010–2050 
 
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
PJ 
Hard coal 280.6 274.5 278.1 278.0 270.1 258.4 245.1 237.5 221.4 
Lignite 6.4 7.0 7.7 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.5 0.1 0.1 
Oil products 6.7 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.3 
Natural gas 31.6 32.7 51.3 52.2 52.1 50.9 49.2 46.9 44.3 
Renewables 12.4 28.3 24.8 26.6 27.7 28.3 28.5 28.1 27.1 
Others 7.1 9.1 10.1 10.6 11.1 11.6 12.1 12.1 11.5 
Total 344.8 357.8 378.0 381.3 374.7 362.7 347.9 330.0 309.8 
% 
Hard coal 81.4 76.7 73.6 72.9 72.1 71.2 70.5 72.0 71.5 
Lignite 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 0.0 0.0 
Oil products 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 
Natural gas 9.2 9.1 13.6 13.7 13.9 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 
Renewables 3.6 7.9 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.2 8.5 8.7 
Others 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2015c: 6). 
 
 
Table A11. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Market Agency (2013) for electricity demand in Poland, by 
economic sectors, 2010–2030 (TWh) 
 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Industry and construction 41.8 43.8 46.5 49.3 53.5 
Transport 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.1 
Agriculture 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 
Trade and services 43.7 46.2 52.5 57.9 63.8 
Households 28.6 29.4 32.3 35.1 38.2 
Total 119.1 124.4 136.6 147.8 161.4 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2015c: 11). 
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Table A12. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Market Agency (2013) for network heat demand in Poland, by 
economic sectors, 2010–2030 (PJ) 
 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Industry and construction 58.9 61.7 64.6 67.5 72.0 
Agriculture 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Trade and services 36.7 33.0 36.6 39.7 42.7 
Households 195.0 176.1 174.1 171.2 168.8 
Total 291.6 271.9 276.4 279.5 284.6 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2015c: 11). 
 
 
Table A13. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Market Agency (2013) for net electricity production in Poland, 
by fuel, 2010–2030 (TWh) 
 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Lignite 45.4 48.5 48.3 48.3 43.6 
Hard coal 81.2 68.7 72.8 68.2 66.8 
Natural gas 4.7 10.7 14.5 13.7 17.1 
Heating oil 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 
Nuclear fuel 0 0.0 0.0 11.2 22.3 
Biomass 4.6 7.3 7.4 7.5 6.5 
Biogas 0.4 1.1 2.0 2.4 2.8 
Bio-oil 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hydropower 2.9 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 
Wind 1.7 6.9 11.1 16.0 21.7 
Solar 0 0.06 0.35 0.99 1.91 
Others 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.10 
Total 143.8 147.9 161.2 173.0 187.5 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2015c: 12). 
 
 
Table A14. Forecasts of the Polish Energy Market Agency (2013) for final electricity demand in Poland, 
various scenarios, 2015–2050 (TWh) 
 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Low scenario 124 135 149 167 179 
Reference scenario 127 140 162 186 204 
High scenario 128 144 171 202 225 
Source: Ministry of Economy, (2015c: 13). 
 
 
Table A15. Forecasts of the European Commission (2013, reference scenario) for primary energy 
production in Poland, by fuel, 2015–2050 (mtoe) 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Had coal and lignite 56.1 56.2 53.5 43.0 39.7 37.3 37.4 36.8 
Oil and oil products 28.2 28.5 28.0 27.8 27.5 27.0 27.1 26.9 
Natural gas 15.1 15.4 17.8 19.0 20.0 20.5 21.1 21.9 
Nuclear energy 0.0 0.0 3.0 11.2 14.1 17.0 17.0 17.0 
Renewables 10.3 13.5 14.8 16.7 18.0 18.7 19.6 20.0 
Total 109.7 113.7 117.1 117.7 119.2 120.5 122.2 122.5 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2015c: 16). 
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Table A16. Forecasts of the European Commission (2013, reference scenario) for electricity production in 
Poland, by fuel, 2015–2050 (TWh) 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Had coal and lignite 155 165 156 118 109 108 122 135 
Renewables 17 27 32 36 43 43 46 49 
Nuclear energy 0 0 13 48 61 74 74 74 
Natural gas 5 7 9 11 12 14 18 17 
Total 177 199 210 213 225 239 260 275 
Source: Ministry of Economy (2015c: 16). 
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